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Abstract	
	
We	find	that	a	greater	extent	of	antitakeover	provisions	is	not	only	more	likely	to	deter	a	bid,	but	
also	more	likely	to	cause	management	resistance	in	the	event	of	a	bid.	The	deterrent	effect	is	likely	
to	be	decreasing	in	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	a	firm.	Our	findings	provide	robust	
support	for	the	notion	that	entrenchment	causes	managers	to	resist	a	bid,	rather	than	that	the	
motive	for	management	resistance	is	to	compensate	for	weaker,	shareholder,	bargaining	power.	
We	also	find	that	a	greater	potential	for	price	improvement	is	unlikely	to	cause	management	to	
resist	a	bid.	
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What	actually	causes	management	to	resist	a	takeover	bid:	price	
improvement	or	managerial	entrenchment?	
1.	 Introduction	
	 In	 the	 event	 of	 a	 firm	 becoming	 the	 target	 of	 a	 takeover	 attempt	 it	 is	 largely	 at	
management’s	discretion	as	to	whether,	and	by	what	means,	to	resist	the	bid.	One	hypothesis	is	
that	management	 resistance	 is	motivated	by	stockholders’	 interests	because	shareholders	are	
less	willing	to	accept	a	lower	quality	offer,	especially	when	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	
the	firm	is	higher	(see	Fishman,	1988;	Hirshleifer	and	Titman,	1990).	An	alternative	hypothesis	
is	that	management	resistance	is	motivated	by	self‐interest	because	managers	are	unwilling	to	
accept	a	higher	quality	offer	at	 the	expense	their	 jobs	and	any	private	benefits	of	control	(see	
Baron,	 1983).	With	 large,	 potentially	 divergent	 stakes	 for	 shareholders	 and	managers,	 there	
remains	 the	 challenge	 for	 researchers,	 and	 corporate	 legislators	 in	 contemplating	 placing	
restrictions	on	managerial	discretion	 (such	as	a	passivity/no	board	veto	 rule),	of	 establishing	
beyond	 reasonable	 doubt	whether	 it	 is	 price	 improvement	 or	managerial	 entrenchment	 that	
actually	causes	management	to	resist	a	bid.1	In	this	study,	we	take	up	this	considerable	challenge.	
	 The	core	difficulty	is	starkly	illustrated	by	Berkovitch	and	Khanna	(1990)	in	which	they	
theorize	that	even	a	more	extreme	form	of	management	resistance,	what	they	refer	to	as	a	value‐
reducing	 defensive	 strategy,	 can	 be	 beneficial	 for	 shareholders.2	 This	 is	 because	 only	 by	
deploying,	or	threatening	to	deploy,	a	value‐reducing	defensive	strategy	(such	as	the	other	post‐
offer	 defenses	 –	 standstill	 agreement,	 litigation,	 and	 asset	 restructuring	 –	 that	 Ruback,	 1987,	
describes)	and	thus	reducing,	or	threatening	to	reduce,	the	value	of	the	target	firm	to	a	specific	
bidder,	but	not	to	potential	bidders,	can	management	elicit	a	higher	quality	offer	from	another	
                                                            
1	Easterbrook	and	Fischel	 (1981)	are	 the	 first	 to	make	 the	case	 for	altogether	 removing	management’s	
discretion	as	to	whether,	and	by	what	means,	to	resist	a	bid.	A	more	recent	case	for	the	enactment	of	a	no	
board	 veto	 rule	 is	 made	 by	 Bebchuk	 (2002).	 For	 a	 case	 for	 placing	 some	 restrictions	 on	 managerial	
discretion	in	response	to	the	threat	of	a	takeover,	see	Gilson	and	Schwartz	(2017).		
2	Stulz	(1988)	theorizes	much	the	same,	but	in	the	specific	context	of	a	post‐offer	defense	that	can	increase	
managerial	control	of	voting	rights,	such	as	a	targeted	repurchase	or	liability	restructuring.	
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bidder,	or	bargain	for	the	same	from	the	bidder	that	it	intends	to	discriminate	against.	They	also	
stress,	however,	that	a	value‐reducing	defensive	strategy	can	be	open	to	abuse	by	a	management	
that	is	already	relatively	entrenched	and	thus	subject	to	weaker	internal	monitoring.	
	 However,	 the	decision	by	management	 to	 resist	 a	 bid,	 and	potentially	deploy	 a	 value‐
reducing	defensive	strategy,	 is	 likely	 to	depend	on	the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	
provisions	 (such	 as	 the	 pre‐bid	 defenses	 –	 staggered/classified	 board,	 super‐majority	
amendment,	 fair	 price	 amendment,	 and	 poison	 pill	 –	 that	 Ruback,	 1987,	 also	 describes).	 The	
hypothesized	motives	for	management	to	deploy	pre‐bid	defenses	are	similar	to	those	for	post‐
offer	defenses	(that	 is,	 increased	bargaining	power	or	managerial	entrenchment).	Straska	and	
Waller	 (2014)	 discuss	 these	motives	 at	 length	 in	 the	 context	 of	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	
provide	an	extensive	review	of	the	associated	literature.	As	they	draw	to	the	reader’s	attention,	a	
common	way	 to	proxy	 for	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 is	 to	use	 the	
Gompers,	 Ishii,	 and	Metrick	 (2003)	 index	 (hereafter	 the	GIM	 index),	which	adds	one	 for	 each	
antitakeover	provision	that	a	firm	has	from	a	total	of	twenty‐four.	As	such,	we	hypothesize	the	
following	 dependences,	 conditional	 on	 motive,	 between	 the	 target	 firm’s	 GIM	 index	 and	 the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance.	On	the	one	hand,	a	negative	relationship	 is	expected	for	
management	resistance	that	 is	motivated	by	price	improvement.	This	 is	because	a	higher	GIM	
index	 is	 more	 sufficient	 to	 elicit	 or	 bargain	 for	 a	 higher	 quality	 offer	 alone	 of	 management	
resistance.	On	the	other	hand,	a	positive	relationship	is	expected	for	management	resistance	that	
is	motivated	by	managerial	entrenchment.	This	is	because	a	higher	GIM	index	is	an	indication	that	
managers	are	already	relatively	entrenched	and	therefore	that	management	resistance	is	more	
open	to	use	and	thus	abuse.	
As	a	solution	to	the	difficulty	of	establishing	beyond	reasonable	doubt	whether	it	is	price	
improvement	or	managerial	entrenchment	that	actually	causes	management	to	resist	a	bid,	we	
use	an	instrumental	variables	(IV)	regression	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance.	We	
instrument	 for	 the	 GIM	 index	 in	 ways	 similar	 to	 Karpoff,	 Schonlau,	 and	Wehrley	 (2017),	 by	
constructing	 separate,	 pseudo	 GIM	 indices	 for	 same‐age	 (peer)	 firms	 and	 headquarters‐
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proximate	(HQ)	firms,	but	excluding	any	such	firms	that	share	the	same	industry	as	the	focus	firm,	
and	constructing	the	pseudo	GIM	indices	many	years	before	the	focus	firm	year.	Since	they	find	
that	a	higher	GIM	index	is	more	likely	to	deter	a	bid,	we	include	the	same	instruments	in	a	reduced	
form	regression	for	bid	likelihood	to	generate	a	lambda	and	account	for	the	effect	of	censoring	
firm	years	absent	a	bid.	As	an	identification	strategy	for	the	purpose	of	generating	a	bid	lambda	
for	the	IV	regression	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance,	we	add	to	the	reduced	form	
regression	for	bid	likelihood	an	exclusion	restriction	that	identifies	a	firm	year	with	California	
incorporation.	Our	rationale	is	that	while	having	a	California	incorporation	is	believed	to	make	a	
firm	relatively	more	vulnerable	 to	a	bid,	most	 reincorporation	activity	 took	place	many	years	
before	it	could	have	plausibly	anticipated	aspects	of	the	bids,	including	management	resistance,	
in	our	sample	(see	Catan	and	Kahan,	2016).			
Without	 using	 the	 instruments,	 we	 find	 a	 positive	 but	 statistically	 insignificant	
relationship	 between	 the	 GIM	 index	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 management	 resistance.	 Strongly	
supported	by	tests	of	instrument	validity	and	endogeneity,	the	relationship	becomes	statistically	
significant	 and	 economically	 meaningful,	 however,	 once	 we	 instrument	 for	 the	 GIM	 index.	
Specifically,	the	effect	of	adding	one	more	antitakeover	provision	to	the	GIM	index	is	expected	to	
increase	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	within	a	range	of	4.0‐5.5	percentage	points,	as	
compared	to	the	unconditional	rate	for	our	sample	of	17.4	percent.3	That	the	true	relationship	is	
steeper	 in	 gradient	 than	 the	 biased	 one	 indicates	 that	 the	 GIM	 index	 is	 reversely,	 negatively	
related	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	 management	 resistance	 because	 unobservable	 factors	 and	
measurement	 error	 have	 little	 effect	 on	 the	 true	 relationship.	 This	 is	 possible	 because	
shareholder	voting	to	remove	antitakeover	provisions	plausibly	anticipates	aspects	of	bids,	like	
management	resistance	(see	Cuñat,	Giné,	and	Guadalupe,	2017).	Also,	it	could	be	more	effective	
for	firms	that	are	unable	to	outright	deter	a	bid	(see	Karpoff	et	al,	2017).	With	strong	sources	of	
                                                            
3	The	unconditional	rate	is	much	higher	in	comparison	to	other	studies	of	management	resistance	(such	as	
Schwert,	2000;	Bates	and	Becher,	2017).	The	main	reason	for	this	is	that	the	GIM	index	data	tracks	larger	
firms.	Our	 smaller	 but	 still	 sizeable	 dataset,	which	 at	 the	 limit	 covers	 the	period	1993‐2012,	 therefore	
indicates	that	management	resistance	matters	more	for	larger	firms.			
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variation	 for	 the	 GIM	 index	 that	 are	 plausibly	 exogenous	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	 management	
resistance,	 the	 pre‐determined	 effect	 of	 the	 GIM	 index	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 managerial	
entrenchment	that	actually	causes	managers	to	resist	a	bid.	To	state	 it	 the	other	way,	that	the	
causal	relationship	is	positive,	and	not	negative,	suggests	that	management	resistance	is	not	used	
to	compensate	 for	a	 lower	GIM	index	being	 less	sufficient	on	 its	own	to	elicit	or	bargain	 for	a	
higher	quality	offer.	
We	 confirm	 the	 findings	 of	 Karpoff	 et	 al	 (2017),	 but	 also	 find	 evidence,	 from	 the	 bid	
lambda,	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	deterrent	effect	of	 a	higher	GIM	 index	 is	decreasing	 in	 the	 cost	of	
acquiring	information	about	the	firm.	In	the	event	of	failing	to	deter	a	bid,	therefore,	the	likelihood	
of	 management	 resistance	 is	 increasing	 in	 the	 GIM	 index,	 no	 matter	 the	 cost	 of	 acquiring	
information	about	the	target	firm.	The	causal	relationship	is	also	traceable	in	the	reduced	form	
and	 robust	 to	 using	 an	 additive	 or	 binary/threshold‐based	 GIM	 index,	 and	 rolling	 or	 fixed	
instruments.	 However,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 relationship	 depends	 on	 the	 subset	 of	 antitakeover	
provisions	 that	 excludes	 the	 six	 provisions	 –	 including	 classified	 board,	 super‐majority	
amendment,	and	poison	pill	–	in	the	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	index	(hereafter	the	BCF	
index).	 We	 confirm	 the	 findings	 of	 Karpoff	 et	 al	 (2017)	 that	 an	 index	 of	 the	 other	 sixteen	
antitakeover	 provisions	 –	 including	 fair	 price	 amendment	 –	 (hereafter	 the	 KSW	 index)	 also	
matters	for	bid	deterrence.	The	deterrent	effect	of	a	higher	BCF	index,	however,	is	unrelated	to	
the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	the	firm,	which	supports	the	claim	of	Bebchuk	et	al	(2009)	
that	their	index	quantifies	the	extent	to	which	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	have	an	especially	
potent	deterrent	effect.				
However,	 whereas	 the	 managerial	 entrenchment	 hypothesis	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 the	
initial	premium	the	same	cannot	be	said	of	the	price	improvement	hypothesis.	To	account	for	this	
in	assessing	whether	price	improvement	actually	causes	management	to	resist	a	bid,	we	therefore	
jointly	instrument	for	the	initial	premium	in	a	way	similar	to	Baker,	Pan,	and	Wurgler	(2012),	by	
relating	the	target	firm’s	pre‐bid	price	to	its	52	week	high	price	to	construct	a	pseudo	premium	
before	 a	 long	 run‐up	 period	 and,	 thus,	 independent	 of	 the	 bid	 announcement	 return,	 and	
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controlling	for	contemporaneous	firm‐specific	information,	and	the	bid	lambda	as	a	proxy	for	the	
cost	 of	 acquiring	 information	 about	 the	 target	 firm,	 in	 the	 IV	 regression.	 Without	 using	 the	
instrument,	we	find	a	negative,	statistically	significant	and	economically	meaningful	relationship	
between	the	initial	premium	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance,	as	is	expected	for	the	
price	 improvement	 hypothesis.	 Strongly	 supported	 again	 by	 tests	 of	 instrument	 validity	 and	
endogeneity,	the	relationship	becomes	statistically	insignificant,	however,	once	we	introduce	the	
source	of	variation	for	the	initial	premium	that	is	also	plausibly	exogenous	to	the	likelihood	of	
management	resistance.	This	suggests	that	even	though	Dimopoulos	and	Sacchetto	(2014)	and	
Bates	 and	 Becher	 (2017)	 find	 that	 management	 resistance	 leads	 to	 price	 improvement	 it	 is	
unlikely	 to	 be	 price	 improvement	 that	 actually	 causes	 managers	 to	 resist	 a	 bid.4	 Also,	 the	
instruments	 for	 the	 GIM	 index	 do	 not	 co‐determine	 the	 initial	 premium	 to	 a	 statistically	
significant	extent,	which	suggests	that	there	is	unlikely	to	be	a	causal	relationship	that	runs	from	
the	GIM	index	to	the	initial	premium.5	
Ex‐post,	the	outcomes	for	shareholders	seem	to	reflect	that,	based	on	the	direct,	ex‐ante	
tests	that	we	conduct,	 it	 is	managerial	entrenchment	and	not	price	 improvement	that	actually	
causes	management	 to	 resist	 a	 bid.	 Specifically,	 to	 a	 statistically	 significant	 and	 economically	
meaningful	extent,	a	bid	that	faces	resistance	from	managers	is	associated	with	a	smaller	wealth	
effect,	 lower	 likelihood	 that	 a	 higher	 quality	 offer	will	 be	 realized,	 and	 lower	 likelihood	 that	
management	 will	 commit	 to	 closing	 out	 the	 deal	 with	 a	 target	 termination	 fee.	 This	 is	 after	
controlling	for	the	main	variables	that	we	use	elsewhere	in	the	analysis,	including	the	GIM	index.	
                                                            
4	Dimopoulos	and	Sacchetto	(2014)	use	a	structural	estimate	for	management	resistance,	irrespective	of	
whether	managers	are	observed	to	resist	a	bid.	They	find,	however,	that	whether	managers	are	observed	
to	 resist	 a	 bid	 matters	 greatly	 for	 increasing	 the	 structural	 estimate	 for	 the	 degree	 of	 management	
resistance.					
5	Cain,	McKeon,	and	Solomon	(2017)	and	Cuñat	et	al	(2017)	find	negative	and	positive	effects,	respectively,	
for	a	causal	relationship	between	a	firm’s	takeover	vulnerability	and	the	premium	in	the	event	of	a	bid.	
There	 are,	 however,	 differences	 in	 approach.	 Cain	 et	 al	 capture	 a	 firm’s	 takeover	 vulnerability	 using	
staggered	 takeover	 laws,	whereas	Cuñat	 et	 al	 do	 so	 following	decisions	by	 shareholders	 of	whether	 to	
rescind	an	antitakeover	provision.	Also,	Cain	et	al	use	the	premium	reflected	in	the	market’s	evaluation	of	
the	wealth	effect	of	a	bid,	whereas,	like	us,	Cuñat	et	al	use	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	bidder.									
‐6‐	
 
Our	study	makes	contributions	 to	 two	main	strands	of	 the	 takeover	 literature.	First,	 a	
body	 of	 work	 examines	 whether	 it	 is	 stockholders’	 interests	 or	managerial	 self‐interest	 that	
makes	it	more	likely	that	management	will	resist	a	bid.	Walkling	and	Long	(1984)	and	Cotter	and	
Zenner	 (1994)	 find	 that	 management	 resistance	 is	 more	 likely	 when	 managerial	 wealth	 is	
expected	to	be	more	adversely	affected	by	a	bid.	While	this	suggests	a	managerial	self‐interest	
motive,	our	evidence	comes	from	a	direct,	ex‐ante	test	in	that	a	higher	GIM	index	is	an	indication	
that	management	is	already	relatively	entrenched.	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	find	no	relationship	
between	a	classified	board	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance.	Our	evidence,	however,	
suggests	that	the	decision	by	management	to	resist	a	bid	depends	on	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	
antitakeover	provisions.	Unlike	all	of	 these	 studies,	our	evidence	 is	 also	 causal.6	 Jennings	 and	
Mazzeo	(1993)	and	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	find	that	management	resistance	is	more	likely	in	
response	to	a	lower	quality	offer.	While	this	suggests	a	price	improvement	motive,	our	evidence	
comes	from	relying	on	an	exogenous	source	of	variation	that	is	specific	to	the	initial	premium	
(unlike	 Jennings	 and	Mazzeo	 who	 share	 it	 with	 other	 suspect	 endogenous	 variables	 in	 their	
simultaneous	equations	framework)	and	then	using	this	to	 instrument	 for	the	initial	premium	
(unlike	 Bates	 and	 Becher	 who	 use	 it	 to	 generate,	 and	 base	 their	 conclusions	 on	 only,	 the	
unexplained	part	of	the	initial	premium).	
Second,	an	extensive	body	of	work	examines	antitakeover	provisions,	with	much	of	it	of	
late	 in	 the	actual	 context	of	 a	bid.	While	Straska	and	Waller	 (2014)	provide	a	 comprehensive	
review	of	the	many	sub‐strands	of	this	work,	two	recent	studies	are	especially	closely	related	to	
ours	in	that	the	evidence	for	the	effects	of	antitakeover	provisions	is	causal.	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	
use	an	IV	regression	framework	to	examine	whether	a	higher	GIM	index	is	more	likely	to	deter	a	
                                                            
6	 Cain	 et	 al	 (2017)	 examine	 the	 incremental	 effects	 of	 staggered	 takeover	 laws	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	 resistance.	 They	 find	 that	 few	 of	 these	 exogenous	 events,	 which	 they	 use	 to	 construct	 a	
measure	of	a	firm’s	takeover	vulnerability	and	find	to	be	highly,	negatively	correlated	with	the	GIM	index,	
effect	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance.	For	those	laws	that	do,	there	is	a	mixture	of	support	for	our	
substitutability	and	managerial	entrenchment	hypotheses	for	the	relationship	between	the	GIM	index	and	
the	 likelihood	 of	 management	 resistance.	 The	 use	 of	 takeover	 laws,	 specifically,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
explaining	a	firm’s	takeover	vulnerability	and	associated	managerial	behavior	is,	however,	a	topic	of	much	
recent	contention	(see	Catan	and	Kahan,	2016;	Karpoff	and	Wittry,	2018).										
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bid.	In	contrast,	Cuñat	et	al	(2017)	use	a	regression	discontinuity	design	to	examine	whether	a	
firm	 is	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 bid	 following	 a	 close	 decision	 by	 shareholders	 to	 rescind	 an	
antitakeover	 provision.7	 Whereas	 these	 studies	 agree	 that	 antitakeover	 provisions	 have	 a	
deterrent	 effect,	 ours	 is	 also	 interested	 in	 the	 effects	 of	 antitakeover	 provisions	 that	 are	
insufficient	to	deter	a	bid	outright.	This	is	because,	whereas	outright	deterrence	is	more	about	
the	 discretion	 of	 a	 potential	 bidder,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 firm	 becoming	 the	 target	 of	 a	 takeover	
attempt	it	is	largely	at	management’s	discretion	as	to	whether,	and	by	what	means,	to	resist	the	
bid.8	Ours	is	therefore	the	first	study	to	treat	the	GIM	index	as	a	suspect	endogenous	variable	for	
simultaneously	explaining	outright	bid	deterrence	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	
in	the	event	of	a	bid.	This	is	important	because,	as	our	findings	suggest,	the	deterrent	effect	of	a	
higher	GIM	index	is	likely	to	be	decreasing	in	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	the	firm.	
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	discusses	the	sample,	motivates	
the	variables,	and	examines	the	relationship	between	management	resistance	and	bid	outcomes	
for	 shareholders.	 Section	 3	 examines	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 GIM	 index	 and	 the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance.	This	covers	the	effects	of	instrumenting	for	the	GIM	index,	
the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid,	and	all	of	these	effects	in	reduced	form.	Section	4	
examines	the	robustness	and	other	considerations	of	the	findings	in	Section	3.	This	covers	rolling	
versus	fixed	instruments	for	the	GIM	index,	an	additive	versus	threshold‐based	measure	for	the	
GIM	index,	a	BCF	versus	KSW	index,	and	a	2012	versus	2009	endpoint	for	the	study.	Section	5	
simultaneously	examines	the	causal	relationship	between	the	initial	premium	and	the	likelihood	
of	management	resistance.	Section	6	concludes.			
	
2.	 Sample,	variables,	and	resistance	and	bid	outcomes	
                                                            
7	Bach	and	Metzger	(2017),	however,	highlight	a	potential	problem	with	using	a	regression	discontinuity	
design	in	the	specific	context	of	close	shareholder	voting	outcomes.		
8	Our	study	of	 the	effects	of	 the	GIM	 index	on	managerial	discretion	 in	 the	event	of	a	bid	complements	
similar	work	on	bidders	by	Masulis,	Wang,	 and	Xie	 (2007)	and	Harford,	Humphery‐Jenner,	 and	Powell	
(2012).	 These	 studies	 find	 evidence,	 but	 not	 causal	 evidence,	 to	 suggest	 that	 a	 higher	 GIM	 index	 is	
associated	with	entrenched	management	making	poorer	bid	decisions.		
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2.1.	 Sample	
	 Our	main	purpose	in	this	study	is	to	examine	the	relationship	between	the	GIM	index	and	
resistance,	 in	 the	 actual	 event	 of	 a	 bid,	 and	whether	 this	 relationship	 is	 causal	 in	 running	 to	
resistance,	even	after	accounting	for	the	effect	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	To	make	it	
possible	to	infer	causality,	we	construct	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	similar	to	those	used	by	
Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	in	finding	that	a	higher	GIM	index	is	more	likely	to	deter	a	bid.	Therefore,	as	
with	 their	 study,	 upon	 which	 our	 analysis	 builds,	 a	 data	 requirement	 for	 each	 and	 every	
component	of	the	GIM	index	places	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	at	the	intersection	of	the	
RiskMetrics	dataset	 for	 the	GIM	 index,	 Securities	Data	Company	 (SDC)	database	 for	bids,	 and	
Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database	for	firms.		
However,	unlike	Karpoff	et	al	(2017),	we	opt	to	exclude	dual	class,	financial,	and	utility	
stocks	from	all	firm	years	included	in	both	the	construction	of	the	GIM	instruments	and	analysis.	
Although	these	stocks	represent	only	a	small	minority	of	firm	years,	shares	with	unequal	voting	
rights	have	the	potential	to	deter	a	bid	independent	of	any	effect	from	a	higher	GIM	index,	and	the	
relationship	between	the	GIM	index	and	bid	deterrence	could	also	be	different	for	financial	and	
utility	 stocks	because	 regulators	 tend	 to	wield	more	power	 in	 these	particular	 industries.	We	
define	a	dual	class	stock	as	a	stock	with	two	classes	of	share	that	have	overlapping	start	and	end	
dates	in	a	given	firm	year,	and	seek	to	ensure	that	where	a	stock’s	industry	affiliation	has	also	
changed	over	time	this	history	is	also	accurately	reflected	in	the	sample	of	firm	years.	Industry	
indicators	are	included	in	all	parts	of	the	analysis.	
Moreover,	because	we	extend	the	analysis	to	resistance	in	the	actual	event	of	a	bid,	the	
sample	of	bids	is	assembled	in	a	somewhat	different	way	to	that	by	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	Instead,	
we	largely	follow	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	in	merging	bids,	for	the	same	target,	separated	by	no	
more	 than	 one	 year	 and	 then	 also	 including	 failed	 bids.	 However,	 we	 exclude	 management	
buyouts,	whereas	they	do	not,	because,	although	infrequent	in	comparison	to	third‐party	bids,	a	
management	buyout	has	the	potential	to	deter,	or	resist,	a	bid	from	a	third	party	independent	of	
any	 effect	 from	 a	 higher	 GIM	 index.	 Also,	 while	 Bates	 and	 Becher	 (2017)	 resort	 to	 a	 partial	
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recoding	of	resistance	because	of	concerns	about	the	way	in	which	SDC	defines	such	bids,	we	use	
primary	(news)	sources,	from	Factiva,	to	cleanly	search	each	and	every	bid	for	any	evidence	of	
resistance.	The	actions	 taken	by	management	 to	 resist	 a	bid,	post‐announcement,	 range	 from	
publicly	 rejecting	 a	deal	 (not	 always	 reported	 in	 the	news	 sources)	 to	deploying	 a	 full‐blown	
defensive	strategy	of	any	type	described	by	Ruback	(1987).	
	 We	present	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	in	Table	1.	Since	the	RiskMetrics	dataset	
starts	from	1990,	beginning	the	sample	in	1993	ensures	that	the	GIM	instruments	are	constructed	
at	least	three	firm	years	before	any	bid.	We	end	the	sample	in	2012,	which	means	that	because	
RiskMetrics	stopped	collecting	data	for	each	and	every	component	of	the	GIM	index	after	2006	it	
is	necessary	to	forward	fill	the	data	for	firm	years	beyond,	and	out	to	as	far	as	2011	in	the	case	of	
the	actual	GIM	index.	This	end	fill	is	longer	than	any	standard	forward	fill	between	data	collection	
points	for	the	GIM	index.	However,	like	Karpoff	et	al	(2017),	we	also	consider	whether	the	results	
from	the	main	part	of	the	analysis	depend	on	the	length	of	the	end	fill.	The	full	sample,	for	1993‐
2012,	 is	 comprised	 of	 995	 bids,	 of	 which	 173	 face	 resistance,	 and	 21,375	 firm	 years.	 These	
numbers	reduce	only	slightly	once	we	take	variable	requirements	into	account.		
Overall,	17.4	percent	of	the	bids	face	resistance.	This	total	percentage	is	much	higher	than	
that	reported	by	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	for	a	largely	overlapping	sample	period.	We	attribute	
this	difference	to	a	combination	of	factors.	First,	their	sample	is	not	restricted	to	targets	included	
in	the	RiskMetrics	dataset.	This	dataset	tracks	larger	firms	and,	as	results	by	Schwert	(2000)	and	
Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	show,	a	larger	target	is	significantly	more	likely	to	resist	a	bid.	Second,	
a	bid	 for	a	smaller	 target	 is	 likely	 to	attract	relatively	sparse	news	coverage.	Third,	Bates	and	
Becher	(2017)	do	not	search	each	and	every	bid	for	any	evidence	of	resistance.	
Also	overall,	a	bid	occurs	in	4.7	percent	of	the	 firm	years.	 In	spite	of	the	differences	in	
sample	construction,	this	total	percentage	and	the	time	trends	for	bids	and	firm	years	are	similar	
to	those	reported	by	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	Interestingly,	years	in	which	a	bid	occurs	for	a	higher	
percentage	of	firms,	particularly	during	the	merger	waves	of	1997‐2000	and	2005‐2007,	tend	to	
be	 years	 in	 which	 a	 smaller	 percentage	 of	 bids	 face	 resistance.	 We	 therefore	 include	 year	
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indicators	in	all	parts	of	the	analysis.	Also,	in	only	two	of	the	last	five	years	of	the	twenty	year	
sample	 period	 does	 the	 percentage	 of	 bids	 that	 face	 resistance	 drop	 below	 the	 total	 rate,	
indicating	that	resistance	 is	 far	 from	being	an	 insignificant	 feature	of	more	recent	bids	(a	 fact	
similarly	highlighted	by	Cain	et	al,	2017).		
For	certain,	however,	wider	samples	of	bids	in	terms	of	target	size,	such	as	those	used	by	
Schwert	(2000)	and	Bates	and	Becher	(2017),	understate	 the	real	 importance	of	resistance	 in	
positioning	the	analysis	more	away	from	larger	firms	for	which	resistance	undoubtedly	matters	
the	most.	We	next	discuss	any	implications	for	variables	related	to	resistance	and	bid	deterrence.	
2.2.	 Variables	
	 Our	 analysis	 incorporates	 three	 groups	 of	 variables.	 First,	 there	 are	 variables	 for	 bid	
outcomes	that	could	be	related	to	resistance.	Second,	there	are	variables	for	initial	features	of	a	
bid	 that	could	be	related	 to	resistance.	Third,	 there	are	variables	 for	 the	GIM	 index	and	other	
features	of	a	firm	that	could	be	related	to	not	only	resistance	in	the	event	of	a	bid,	but	also	outright	
bid	deterrence.	Descriptive	statistics	and	difference	in	means	are	presented	in	Table	2	for	all	of	
the	 main	 variables	 partitioned	 by	 two	 dummy	 variables	 that	 overarch	 the	 analysis:	 one	
identifying	a	bid	that	faces	resistance;	the	other	identifying	a	firm	year	in	which	a	bid	occurs	and	
hence	is	not	outright	deterred.	Definitions	for	all	of	the	variables	included	at	some	stage	in	the	
analysis	are	presented	at	the	end	of	the	paper.	
	 We	measure	the	market’s	assessment	of	the	wealth	effect	from	a	bid	using	announcement,	
post‐announcement,	 and	 post‐bid	 returns.	 No	 matter	 the	 abnormal	 return,	 resistance	 is	
seemingly	 associated	 with	 a	 much	 smaller	 wealth	 effect.	 At	 this	 precursory	 stage,	 these	
statistically	significant	differences	 in	mean	returns	are	 inconsistent	with	results	 in	Huang	and	
Walkling	(1987)	and	Schwert	(2000)	that	show	no	clear‐cut	relationship	between	resistance	and	
the	wealth	effect	of	a	bid.	Again,	this	contrast	could	be	because	our	analysis	is	positioned	more	on	
larger	firms	for	which	resistance	matters	the	most.		
As	for	what	the	bidder	is	prepared	to	pay	to	close	out	a	deal,	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	find	
that	resistance	is	more	likely	to	result	in	an	increased	premium	for	an	initially	lower	quality	bid.	
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However,	 our	 univariate	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	 final	 premium	 is	 no	 higher	 in	 the	 face	 of	
resistance.	That	the	final	premium	is	also	no	lower	could	matter	just	the	same	because,	consistent	
with	 results	 in	Walkling	 (1985)	and	Bates	 and	Becher	 (2017),	 resistance	 is	 associated	with	a	
much	lower	rate	of	completion	and	hence	realization	of	the	final	premium.	Moreover,	because	
resistance	is	also	associated	with	far	less	commitment	from	management	to	close	out	a	deal	in	
agreeing	to	otherwise	pay	a	termination	fee.	Indeed,	Officer	(2003)	finds	that	a	target	termination	
fee	is	generally	a	beneficial	arrangement	for	shareholders.	
Our	univariate	results	suggest	that	resistance	is	related	to	not	only	bid	outcomes,	but	also	
initial	features	of	a	bid.	To	begin	with,	resistance	is	associated	with	a	much	lower	initial	premium.	
Although	this	result	is	consistent	with	what	Jennings	and	Mazzeo	(1993)	find,	they	also	treat	the	
initial	premium	as	a	suspect	endogenous	variable.	In	Section	5,	we	motivate	use	of	the	variable,	
pre‐bid	price	to	high	price,	as	a	strong	source	of	variation	for	the	initial	premium	(see	Baker	et	al,	
2012)	 that	 is	 also	 plausibly	 exogenous	 to	 resistance.	 However,	 the	 statistically	 insignificant	
difference	 in	means	 for	 this	 instrumental	variable	suggests	 that	 there	 is	no	 indirect	 trace	of	a	
causal	relationship	running	from	the	 initial	premium	to	resistance.	That	 is,	on	the	basis	of	the	
initial	premium,	resistance	may	not	be	motivated	by	price	improvement.	However,	resistance	is	
associated	much	more	with	an	all	cash	bid,	which	is	consistent	with	what	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	
find	in	reverse	for	any	stock	bid.	Malmendier	et	al	(2016)	suggest	management	is	more	likely	to	
infer	a	signal	from	a	cash	bid	that	the	bidder	believes	the	target	is	undervalued.	Therefore,	to	this	
extent	only	does	a	price	 improvement	motive	 for	resistance	gain	convincing	support	 from	the	
univariate	results	for	the	initial	features	of	a	bid.	
A	precursory	look	at	the	remaining	relationships	in	Table	2	suggests	that,	in	the	event	of	
a	bid,	resistance	is	also	related	to	the	GIM	index	and	other	features	of	a	firm,	but	that	so	too	is	
outright	bid	deterrence.	Yet,	there	are	some	notable	contrasts	between	the	separate	partitions	
for	resistance	and	bid	deterrence,	not	least	for	the	GIM	index	and	firm	size.		
Resistance	 is	 seemingly	 associated	 with	 a	 much	 higher	 GIM	 index,	 whereas	 for	 bid	
deterrence	the	difference	in	means	for	this	variable	is	statistically	insignificant.	However,	Karpoff	
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et	al	(2017)	treat	the	GIM	index	as	a	suspect	endogenous	variable	in	the	context	of	bid	deterrence.	
In	 Section	 3.1,	 we	 motivate	 use	 of	 the	 two	 variables,	 peers	 GIM	 instrument	 and	 HQ	 GIM	
instrument,	as	strong	sources	of	variation	for	the	GIM	index	that	are	also	plausibly	exogenous	to	
not	 only	bid	deterrence,	 as	Karpoff	 et	 al	 (2017)	 contend,	 but	 also	 resistance.	The	 statistically	
significant	differences	in	the	means	for	these	two	instrumental	variables	suggest	that	there	is	an	
indirect	 trace	 of	 a	 positive	 causal	 relationship	 running	 from	 the	 GIM	 index	 to	 not	 only	 bid	
deterrence,	consistent	with	what	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	find,	but	also	resistance.	That	is,	on	the	basis	
of	 the	 GIM	 index,	 resistance	 may	 be	 motivated	 by	 management	 entrenchment.	 Resistance	 is	
seemingly	not	a	substitute	for	pre‐bid	antitakeover	defenses	by	possibly	affording	management	
more	bargaining	power	for	price	improvement.		
The	univariate	relationships	for	the	other	features	of	a	firm	suggest	that	these	variables	
are	 related	 more	 to	 bid	 deterrence	 than	 resistance.	 This	 observation	 is	 also	 apparent	 from	
comparing	results	for	similar	groups	of	variables	in	Schwert	(2000)	and	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	for	
resistance	and	bid	deterrence,	respectively.	Indeed,	Schwert	(2000)	concludes	that	the	dominant	
effect	on	resistance	comes	from	a	larger	target	being	more	likely	to	resist	a	bid.	Our	univariate	
results	suggest	that	bid	deterrence	is	associated	much	more	with	larger	firms,	consistent	with	
what	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	and	numerous	other	studies	find.	However,	for	resistance	the	difference	
in	means	for	firm	size	is	statistically	insignificant.	Given	that	the	firms	in	our	sample	are	relatively	
large	in	being	restricted	to	those	included	in	the	RiskMetrics	dataset	for	the	GIM	index,	the	latter	
result,	 even	 though	 the	 largest	 firms	 are	 censored,	 could	 be	 another	 sign	 that	 our	 analysis	 is	
positioned	more	on	larger	firms	for	which	resistance	matters	the	most.	
For	certain,	to	reliably	examine	the	relationships	between	the	features	of	a	firm,	including	
the	GIM	index,	and	resistance	will	necessitate	accounting	for	the	effect	of	censoring	firm	years	
absent	a	bid.	
2.3.	 Resistance	and	bid	outcomes	
The	univariate	results	discussed	in	the	previous	subsection	suggest	that	bid	outcomes,	
variously	 defined,	 are	 substantially	worse	 for	 target	 stockholders	 in	 the	 face	 of	management	
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resistance.	However,	the	univariate	results	additionally	reveal	that	other	variables	(including	the	
target’s	GIM	index),	also	conceivably	correlated	with	these	bid	outcomes,	differ	significantly	in	
the	 presence	 of	 target	 management	 resistance.	 In	 this	 subsection,	 we	 therefore	 examine	 the	
relationship	between	bid	outcomes	and	target	management	resistance	after	having	controlled	for	
these	omitted	variables.	These	multivariate	results	are	presented	in	Table	3.	For	each	of	the	bid	
outcomes,	 the	 multivariate	 result	 for	 the	 relationship	 of	 interest	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	
corresponding	univariate	result.		
The	 linear	 regression	 results	 in	 Column	 (1)	 of	 Table	 3	 reveal	 that	 the	 target’s	 bid	
announcement	return	is	statistically	(at	one	percent	significance	level)	lower	by	9.3	percentage	
points	in	the	face	of	management	resistance.	Given	the	targets’	mean	bid	announcement	returns	
presented	in	Table	2,	this	average	marginal	effect	is	also	economically	substantial.	Moreover,	the	
linear	regression	results	in	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	of	Table	3	reveal	that	the	target’s	lower	return,	
in	the	face	of	management	resistance,	persists	(with	similar	statistical	significance	and	economic	
magnitude)	through	to	the	post‐announcement	and	post‐bid	periods,	respectively.		
Whilst	the	linear	regression	results	in	Column	(4)	of	Table	3	reveal	that	the	final	premium	
is	no	different	statistically	(based	on	a	10	percent	significance	level)	in	the	face	of	bid	resistance,	
the	probit	regression	results	in	Column	(5),	which	are	after	having	controlled	for	this	premium,	
reveal	 that	 a	 bid	 is	 30.1	 percentage	 points	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 completed	 in	 the	 face	 of	 target	
management	 resistance.	Given	 the	mean	 relative	 frequencies	 of	 a	 completed	bid	presented	 in	
Table	2,	this	average	marginal	effect	is	not	only	statistically	significant	(at	the	one	percent	level),	
but	also	economically	substantial.	Moreover,	the	probit	regression	results	in	Column	(6)	of	Table	
3,	which	are	after	having	controlled	for	the	initial	premium,	reveal	that	a	bid	is	34.8	percentage	
points	 less	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 termination	 fee	 at	 some	 stage	 on	 the	 target’s	 side	 in	 the	 face	 of	
management	resistance.	Again,	given	the	mean	relative	frequencies	of	a	termination	fee	on	the	
target’s	side,	this	average	marginal	effect	is	not	only	statistically	significant	(at	the	one	percent	
level),	but	also	economically	substantial.	
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3.	 The	GIM	index	and	resistance	
The	multivariate	 results	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 do	 not	 align	well	 with	 the	
empirical	assessment	of	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	that	bid	resistance	is	essentially	motivated	by	
serving	target	shareholders’	interests	and	has	little,	or	nothing,	to	do	with	arising	from	a	position	
of	 management	 entrenchment.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 therefore	 use	 a	 variety	 of	 multivariate	
frameworks	to	examine	the	relationship	between	bid	resistance	and	the	target’s	GIM	index,	as	a	
means	to	conduct	direct,	ex‐ante	tests	of	a	price	improvement	versus	managerial	entrenchment	
motive	for	management	resistance.	
3.1.	 Effect	of	instrumenting	the	GIM	index		
First,	the	ordinary	linear	probability	regression	results	in	Column	(1)	of	Table	4	reveal	
that	 the	 likelihood	of	 bid	 resistance	 is	 positively,	 but	 not	 statistically	 (based	 on	 a	 10	percent	
significance	level),	related	to	the	target’s	GIM	index.	There	are	several	possible	explanations	to	
account	for	why	it	is	that	this	multivariate	result	for	the	relationship	of	interest	is	statistically	at	
odds	with	the	corresponding	univariate	result	discussed	in	Section	2.		
One	 explanation	 is	 that	 other	 variables	 that	 differ	 significantly	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 bid	
resistance	 are	 also	 conceivably	 correlated	 with	 the	 target’s	 GIM	 index.	 In	 particular,	 and	
consistent	 with	 the	 corresponding	 univariate	 results,	 target	 management	 resistance	 is	
statistically	(at	one	percent	significance	level)	more	likely	for	a	bid	with	a	lower	initial	premium	
and	for	an	all	cash	initial	offer.	To	the	extent	that	a	lower	initial	premium	signals	a	lower	quality	
bid	(see	Jennings	and	Mazzeo,	1993;	Bates	and	Becher,	2017)	and	an	all	cash	initial	offer	signals	
an	 undervalued	 target	 (see	 Malmendier,	 Opp,	 and	 Saidi,	 2016),	 these	 associations	 provide	
potential	 support	 for	 the	 price	 improvement	 hypothesis	 to	 explain	 management	 resistance.9	
Moreover,	 should	 the	 initial	premium	and	an	all	 cash	 initial	offer	be	negatively	and	positively	
correlated,	respectively,	with	 the	 target’s	GIM	index,	and	to	a	sufficient	extent,	 then	no	 longer	
omitting	the	average	marginal	effects	for	these	other	variables	might	account	for	why	it	is	that	
                                                            
9	In	Section	5,	we	attempt	to	address	the	question	of	whether	or	not	a	lower	initial	premium	actually	causes	
target	management	resistance	to	be	more	likely.		
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the	 relationship	between	bid	 resistance	 and	 the	 target’s	GIM	 index,	whilst	 still	 positive,	 is	 no	
longer	statistically	significant.	These	correlations	would	be	of	particular	concern	were	we	to	find	
evidence	to	suggest	that	bid	resistance	and	more	pre‐existing	defenses,	in	the	form	of	a	higher	
GIM	index,	are	substitute	mechanisms	that	possibly	afford	target	management	more	bargaining	
power	for	price	improvement.											
Another	 explanation	 is	 that	 neither	 the	 multivariate	 result	 nor	 the	 corresponding	
univariate	result	correctly	captures	the	relationship	between	bid	resistance	and	the	target’s	GIM	
index.	This	concern	arises	from	the	possibility	of	reverse	causality	in	that	the	target’s	GIM	index	
might	 not	 be	 sufficiently	 pre‐determined	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	 bid	 resistance.	
Management	might	have	recently	added	defenses	(see	Karpoff	et	al,	2017)	to,	or	been	forced	to	
shed	defenses	(see	Cuñat	et	al,	2017)	from,	the	target’s	GIM	index	to	pre‐empt,	or	signal,	a	more	
likely	response	in	the	event	of	a	bid.	It	also	arises	from	the	possibility	that	unobservable	factors	
that	differ	significantly	in	the	presence	of	bid	resistance	are	also	conceivably	correlated	with	the	
target’s	GIM	index.	The	hidden	effects	of	unobservable	factors	might	be	from	information	that	is	
only	in	the	hands	of	one	bidder,	and	management,	and	that	can	be	used	to	quantify	the	full	extent	
to	which	a	bid	undervalues	the	target	(see	Fishman,	1988).	Lastly,	this	concern	also	arises	from	
the	possibility	that	the	additive	nature	of	the	GIM	index	measures	with	error	the	true	effect	of	the	
extent	of	the	target	firms’	antitakeover	provisions.				
	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 address	 these	 endogeneity	 concerns,	we	 therefore	 next	 examine	 the	
relationship	between	bid	resistance	and	the	target’s	GIM	index	after	having	instrumented	for	the	
suspect	 endogenous	 variable,	 using	 the	 target’s	 peers	 and	 HQ	 GIM	 indexes	 as	 instrumental	
variables.	The	first	and	second	stages	that	comprise	these	IV	linear	probability	regression	results	
are	presented	in	Columns	(2)	and	(3),	respectively,	of	Table	4.		
The	 first	 stage	 results,	 after	 having	 regressed	 the	 target’s	 GIM	 index	 on	 the	 two	
instrumental	variables	and	the	other	variables	included	in	the	second	stage,	reveal	that	both	of	
the	 instrumental	 variables	 have	 a	 strong,	 positive	 association	 with	 the	 target’s	 GIM	 index.	
Specifically,	raising	the	target’s	peers	and	HQ	GIM	indexes	by	one	point	each	(which	equates	to	
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all	firms	in	the	respective	instrument	cohort	having	an	extra	defense	from	the	GIM	index	arsenal)	
is	 predicted	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 target’s	 GIM	 index	 being	 higher	 by	 0.60	 and	 0.28	 points,	
respectively.	Given	the	targets’	mean	GIM	indexes	presented	in	Table	2,	these	average	marginal	
effects	are	not	only	statistically	significant	(at	the	one	and	five	percent	levels	for	the	target’s	peers	
and	HQ	GIM	indexes,	respectively),	but	also	economically	substantial.		
That	any	firm’s	current	GIM	index	is	plausibly	determined	by	the	defenses	that	either	peer	
or	HQ	proximate,	but	not	same	industry,	firms	chose	to	deploy	many	years	in	the	past	(see	Karpoff	
et	al,	2017)	is	thus	a	proposition	that	also	garners	support	after	having	only	selected	firms	that	
are	on	the	receiving	end	of	a	bid.	In	fact,	our	estimate	of	the	average	marginal	effect	for	the	target’s	
peers	GIM	index	is	substantially	larger	than	that	of	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	One	possible	explanation	
for	this	difference	is	that,	at	this	stage	in	the	study,	we	are	censoring	firm	years	that	are	absent	a	
bid.10	However,	our	estimate	of	the	average	marginal	effect	for	the	target’s	HQ	GIM	index	is	in	
close	alignment	to	that	of	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	Another	possible	explanation	is	that,	unlike	Karpoff	
et	al	(2017),	we	have	opted	to	exclude	dual	class,	financial,	and	utility	stocks	at	both	the	level	of	
the	firm	and	respective	instrument	cohort.	
Irrespective,	 the	 F‐statistic	 for	 gauging	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 target’s	 peers	 and	HQ	GIM	
indexes	in	the	first	stage	is	38.3,	and	thus	substantially	in	excess	of	the	recommended	minimum	
level	of	10	(see	Angrist	and	Pischke,	2009,	p.	213)	for	the	instrumental	variables	in	isolation	from	
the	other	variables.	Moreover,	after	having	included	more	than	one	instrumental	variable	in	the	
first	stage,	we	confidently	fail	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	(for	a	chi2	test	of	over‐identification,	
based	on	a	10	percent	significance	level)	that	the	two	simultaneous	sources	of	variation	for	the	
target’s	 GIM	 index	 are	 sufficiently	 exogenous	 as	 to	 not	 result	 in	 the	 IV	 linear	 probability	
regression	being	over‐identified.			
The	average	marginal	effects	for	the	target’s	peers	and	HQ	GIM	indexes	are	after	having	
netted	 off	 the	 average	 marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 other	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 second	 stage.	
                                                            
10	In	the	next	subsection,	we	attempt	to	address	concerns	that	pertain	to	the	potential	for	sample	selection	
bias.		
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However,	apart	from	a	larger	sized	target	and	a	target	with	lower	ROA	each	being	predicted	to	
have	a	higher	GIM	index,	none	of	these	other	variables	have	an	average	marginal	effect	that	is	
statistically	significant	(to	at	least	the	10	percent	level).	Interestingly,	whilst	the	initial	premium	
and	 an	 all	 cash	 initial	 offer	 seemingly	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 positively	 and	 negatively	 correlated,	
respectively,	with	the	target’s	GIM	index,	these	correlations	are	sufficiently	weak	as	to	alleviate	
our	earlier	concern	about	these	other	variables.	
For	the	two	instrumental	variables	to	also	have	validity	in	the	second	stage	of	the	IV	linear	
probability	 regression,	 the	 target’s	 peers	 and	 HQ	 GIM	 indexes	 should	 plausibly	 effect	 bid	
resistance	only	by	way	of	being	exogenous	sources	of	variation	for	the	target’s	GIM	index.	Karpoff	
et	al	(2017)	vigorously	contend	that	any	firm’s	current	likelihood	of	being	on	the	receiving	end	of	
a	bid	cannot	have	plausibly	been	anticipated	by	the	defenses	that	either	peer	or	HQ	proximate,	
but	not	same	industry,	firms	chose	to	deploy	many	years	in	the	past.	However,	we	have	no	cause	
to	doubt	that	this	reasoning	does	not	also	apply	to	the	firm’s	likely	management	response	in	the	
actual	event	of	a	bid.	
The	 second	 stage	 results,	 after	 having	 regressed	 bid	 resistance	 on	 the	 target’s	
instrumented	 GIM	 index	 and	 the	 other	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 ordinary	 linear	 probability	
regression,	reveal	that	raising	the	target’s	instrumented	GIM	index	by	one	point	(which	equates	
to	 the	 target	 having	 an	 extra	 defense	 from	 the	 GIM	 index	 arsenal)	 is	 predicted	 to	 make	 bid	
resistance	5.9	percentage	points	more	likely.	Given	the	total	percentage	of	resisted	bids	presented	
in	Table	1,	 this	average	marginal	 effect	 is	not	only	 statistically	 significant	 (at	 the	one	percent	
level),	but	also	economically	substantial.	Moreover,	we	cannot	fail	to	accept	the	null	hypothesis	
(for	a	chi2	test	of	endogeneity,	based	on	a	1	percent	significance	level)	that	the	target’s	GIM	index	
is	sufficiently	exogenous	with	respect	to	bid	resistance.		
By	way	of	comparison	with	 the	corresponding	average	marginal	effect	 in	 the	ordinary	
linear	 probability	 regression,	 these	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	 target’s	 GIM	 index	 is	 reversely,	
negatively	related	to	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	because	in	subsequent	sections	we	
specifically	find	that	unobservable	factors	and	measurement	error	have	little	effect	on	the	true	
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relationship.	 Cuñat	 et	 al	 (2017)	 suggest	 that	 shareholder	 voting	 to	 remove	 antitakeover	
provisions	plausibly	anticipates	aspects	of	bids,	like	management	resistance.	Also,	the	findings	of	
Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	suggest	that	this	could	be	more	effective	for	firms	that	are	unable	to	outright	
deter	a	bid.	With	strong	sources	of	variation	for	the	GIM	index	that	are	plausibly	exogenous	to	the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance,	the	pre‐determined	effect	of	the	GIM	index	suggests	that	it	
is	managerial	entrenchment	that	actually	causes	managers	to	resist	a	bid.	
Therefore,	whilst	a	higher	GIM	index	has	a	greater	likelihood	of	deterring	a	bid	in	the	first	
place	(see	Karpoff	et	al,	2017),	a	higher	GIM	index	would	also	seem	to	exacerbate	the	likelihood	
of	 management	 resistance	 in	 the	 actual	 event	 of	 a	 bid.	 If	 so,	 this	 finding	 suggests	 that	 bid	
resistance	arises	 from	a	position	of	management	entrenchment,	and	does	not	 substitute	 for	a	
lower	 GIM	 index	 by	 possibly	 affording	 target	 management	 more	 bargaining	 power	 for	 price	
improvement.	Given	the	plausibility	 for	the	target’s	 instrumented	GIM	index	being	sufficiently	
pre‐determined	with	respect	to	the	likelihood	of	bid	resistance,	we	go	as	far	as	to	suggest	that	a	
higher	GIM	index	actually	causes	bid	resistance	to	be	more	 likely.	That	 is,	 to	 the	extent	 that	a	
higher	GIM	index	is	a	direct,	ex‐ante	proxy	for	management	entrenchment,	bid	resistance	is	likely	
motivated	by	target	management	entrenchment.	
	 The	 average	 marginal	 effects	 of	 the	 other	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 ordinary	 linear	
probability	regression	(including	the	initial	premium	and	an	all	cash	initial	offer)	are	essentially	
unchanged	in	terms	of	both	statistical	significance	and	economic	magnitude.	This	observation	is	
perhaps	not	surprising	in	light	of	the	fact	that	hardly	any	of	these	other	variables	(including	the	
initial	premium	and	an	all	cash	initial	offer)	have	average	marginal	effects	that	are	statistically	
significant	in	the	first	stage	of	the	IV	linear	probability	regression.		
However,	 average	marginal	 effects	 estimated	 using	 ordinary	 and	 IV	 linear	 probability	
regressions	might	not	be	 reliable	when	generated	 in	 the	context	of	 a	dichotomous	dependent	
variable,	 like	 the	 presence	 of	 target	 management	 resistance.	 With	 this	 concern	 in	 mind,	 in	
Columns	(4),	(5),	and	(6)	of	Table	4,	we	present	average	marginal	effects	estimated	using	probit	
regressions	that	are	otherwise	equivalent	to	the	linear	probability	regressions	in	Columns	(1),	
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(2),	 and	 (3),	 respectively.	 The	 ordinary	 and	 IV	 probit	 regressions	 generate	 average	marginal	
effects	that	are	in	close	alignment	to	those	estimated	using	the	corresponding	linear	probability	
regressions.	Moreover,	the	conclusions	that	we	draw	from	both	of	the	probit	regressions	are	the	
same	as	those	that	we	draw	from	the	linear	probability	regressions,	including	from	a	chi2	test	of	
endogeneity	in	the	case	of	the	IV	probit	regression.11	
3.2.	 Effect	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid																		
	 Although	 the	 average	 marginal	 effect	 of	 the	 instrumented	 GIM	 index	 is	 plausibly	
unhindered	by	reverse	causality,	there	remains	the	concern	that	the	effect	on	resistance	is	biased	
as	a	result	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	Three	conditions	must	be	met	for	sample	selection	
bias	to	potentially	matter	in	this	context.12	First,	a	higher,	instrumented	GIM	index	must	be	more	
likely	to	deter	a	bid.	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	provide	evidence	that	validates	this	condition.	Second,	
unobservable	factors	that	make	a	bid	more	likely	must	also	make	resistance	more	or	less	likely.	
In	particular,	valuable	information	in	the	hands	of	only	one	bidder	might	lead	to	a	larger	share	of	
any	takeover	gains,	and	hence	make	it	more	likely	that	a	bid	will	proceed.	However,	in	response,	
resistance	might	be	more	likely	as	management	attempts	to	reduce	this	information	advantage	in	
order	 to	 attract	 competing	 bidders,	 or	 strengthen	 its	 bargaining	 position.	 Fishman	 (1988)	
theorizes	that	such	a	scenario	is	more	likely	the	greater	is	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	
the	 target	 firm.	 Third,	 the	 joint	 effect	 of	 unobservable	 factors	 must	 be	 correlated	 with	 the	
instrumented	GIM	index.	
	 We	initially	set	out	to	replicate	the	results	of	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	However,	whereas	they	
use	an	IV	linear	probability	regression,	we	use	an	IV	probit	regression	for	this	purpose	because	
the	joint	effect	of	unobservable	factors	(bid	lambda)	is	more	reliably	estimated	using	a	regression	
intended	for	use	with	a	dichotomous	dependent	variable.	The	results,	for	an	unbalanced	panel	of	
firm	years,	are	presented	in	Columns	(1)	and	(2)	of	Table	5	and	in	all	respects	are	in	fairly	close	
                                                            
11	Tests	of	the	first	stage	strength	of	instrumental	variables	and	of	over‐identification	are	not	possible	for	
an	IV	probit	regression.	Hence	our	decision	to	initially	favor	linear	probability	regressions.							
12	See	Certo,	Busenbark,	Woo,	and	Semadeni	(2016)	for	an	extensive	discussion	of	how	the	conditions	apply	
to	other	takeover	contexts.	
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alignment	to	those	of	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	In	failing	to	accept	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	GIM	
index	is	sufficiently	exogenous	with	respect	to	deterring	a	bid,	we	next	confront	the	challenge	
posed	by	having	a	proven	endogenous	variable	in	both	stages	of	the	analysis.																												
	 As	 a	 solution	 to	 this	 problem	 (suggested	 by	Wooldridge,	 2010,	 pp.	 809‐813),	 we	 re‐
estimate	the	IV	probit	regression	in	reduced	form,	generate	the	bid	lambda,	and	include	it	as	an	
additional	exogenous	variable	 in	 the	 IV	 linear	probability	regression	 for	predicting	resistance.	
This	way,	the	same	two	instrumental	variables	(peers	GIM	index	and	HQ	GIM	index),	and	all	other	
variables	not	conditional	on	a	bid	(size	through	to	industry	concentration,	and	year	and	industry	
indicators),	are	included	in	both	stages.	To	meet	the	need	for	an	exclusion	restriction,	we	add	only	
to	 the	 reduced	 form	 regression	 a	 dummy	 variable	 identifying	 a	 firm	 year	 with	 California	
incorporation.	Because	of	a	long	history	of	adversity	to	takeover	defenses	by	legislators	in	the	
State,	having	a	California	incorporation	is	believed	to	make	a	firm	relatively	more	susceptible	to	
a	bid	(see	Catan	and	Kahan,	2016;	Amihud,	Schmid,	and	Solomon,	2017),	a	belief	that	is	strongly	
borne	out	by	the	reduced	form	results	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	At	the	same	time,	and	as	also	
pointed	out	by	Catan	and	Kahan	(2016),	most	reincorporation	activity,	including	out	of	California,	
took	place	at	the	height	of	State	antitakeover	enactments	in	the	mid	to	late	1980s,	and	hence	many	
years	 before	 it	 could	 have	 plausibly	 been	 influenced	 by	 aspects	 of	 the	 bids	 in	 our	 sample.13	
Furthermore,	we	bootstrap	standard	errors	in	the	final,	IV	linear	probability,	regression	because	
of	manual	adding	of	the	bid	lambda.14	
	 Even	with	 the	 addition	 of	 an	 exclusion	 restriction,	 the	 results	 from	 the	 reduced	 form	
regression	are	consistent	with	those	for	the	IV	probit	regression,	and	the	reduced	form	results	of	
Karpoff	 et	 al	 (2017).	 The	 results	 provide	 further	 evidence	 that,	 with	 exogenous	 sources	 of	
variation,	a	higher	GIM	index	is	more	likely	to	deter	a	bid.	Moreover,	even	with	the	inclusion	of	
                                                            
13	Amihud	et	al	(2017)	use	California	incorporation	as	one	of	several	instrumental	variables	for	predicting	
a	staggered,	or	classified,	board,	one	of	the	components	of	the	GIM	index.	They	find	that	being	incorporated	
in	California	makes	it	significantly	less	likely	for	a	firm	to	have	adopted	a	staggered	board.			
14	Using	conventional,	robust	standard	errors	(as	in	the	previous	subsection)	does	not	substantially	alter	
the	results.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	level	of	the	firm	in	the	reduced	form	regression	and	non‐
clustered	in	the	final	regression	(again,	consistent	with	treatment	in	the	previous	subsection).	
‐21‐	
 
the	bid	lambda,	the	results	for	the	IV	linear	probability	regression	for	predicting	resistance,	in	
Columns	(4)	and	(5)	of	Table	5,	closely	accord	with	those	discussed	in	the	previous	subsection.	In	
the	second	stage	in	Column	(5),	the	average	marginal	effect	for	the	bid	lambda	is	positive	and	
statistically	 significant,	 which	 might,	 as	 Fishman	 (1988)	 theorizes,	 be	 because	 valuable	
information	in	the	hands	of	only	one	bidder,	and	management,	makes	it	more	likely	that	a	bid	will	
proceed	and	face	resistance.	If	so,	this	private	information	needs	to	be	especially	valuable,	made	
possible	if	it	is	more	costly	to	acquire	information	about	the	firm,	for	a	bid	not	to	otherwise	be	
deterred	by	an	especially	high	GIM	index.	This	positive	correlation	between	the	bid	lambda	and	
GIM	index	is	clearly	evident	in	the	first	stage	in	Column	(4).	However,	the	effect	in	the	second	
stage	is	relatively	insubstantial,	as	is	shown	by	the	size	and	statistical	significance	of	the	average	
marginal	 effect	 for	 the	 instrumented	GIM	 index	 being	 smaller	 than	before,	 but	 not	 to	 a	 great	
degree.	Therefore,	in	the	event	of	failing	to	outright	deter	a	bid,	the	likelihood	of	management	
resistance	is	increasing	in	the	GIM	index	no	matter	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	the	
target	firm.	That	is,	even	after	accounting	for	the	effect	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid,	the	
inference	we	draw	from	an	interpretation	of	the	GIM	index	effect	is	that	the	dominant	motive	for	
resistance	is	management	entrenchment	and	not	pursuit	of	a	better	outcome	for	shareholders.																									
Interestingly,	the	first	stage	effects	for	the	two	instrumental	variables,	even	having	netted	
off	the	effect	for	bid	lambda,	are	only	slightly	weaker	than	those	in	the	IV	probit	regression	for	
predicting	a	bid.	This	 effectively	 rules	out	 censoring	of	 firm	years	 absent	 a	bid	 as	 one	of	 two	
possible	explanations,	given	in	the	previous	subsection,	to	account	for	a	larger	effect	for	the	peers	
GIM	instrument	(only)	in	comparison	to	that	in	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	Of	the	other	variables	in	both	
first	stages,	only	firm	size	matters	consistently	for	the	GIM	index,	with	the	two	variables	being	
positively	correlated.	Moreover,	in	the	respective	second	stages,	a	larger	firm	is	more	likely	to	
deter	a	bid,	but	not	more,	or	less,	likely	to	resist	in	the	event	of	a	bid.	In	contrast,	both	Schwert	
(2000)	and	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	show	a	result	suggesting	that	larger	firms	are	more	likely	to	
resist	a	bid.	However,	both	of	these	studies	neither	reveal	how	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	
affects	the	result,	nor,	perhaps	more	importantly,	account	for	complementarity	between	firm	size	
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and	the	GIM	index.15	Our	results	suggest	that,	with	exogenous	sources	of	variation	independent	
of	firm	size,	only	the	instrumented	GIM	index	matters	for	predicting	resistance.	
As	in	the	previous	subsection,	changing	only	the	form	of	the	final	regression	from	IV	linear	
probability	to	IV	probit,	in	Columns	(6)	and	(7)	of	Table	5,	does	not	substantially	alter	the	results	
pertaining	to	the	effect	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	
3.3.	 Effect	in	the	reduced	form	
Instrumental	variables	should	not	plausibly	affect	the	outcome	variable	other	than	by	way	
of	being	exogenous	sources	of	variation	 for	 the	suspect	endogenous	variable.	However,	 in	 the	
event	 of	 both	 failing	 to	 rule	 out	 endogeneity	 and	 finding	 a	 strong	 relationship	 between	 the	
outcome	variable	and	instrumented	variable,	Angrist	and	Pischke	(2009,	p.	213)	suggest	that	it	
would	be	out	of	the	ordinary	were	a	trace	of	this	direct	relationship	not	to	be	discernible	in	the	
reduced	 (indirect)	 form.	 That	 is,	 by	 regressing	 the	 outcome	 variable	 (resistance)	 on	 the	
instrumental	variables	(peers	and	HQ	GIM	instruments)	and	all	of	the	other	variables,	except	for	
the	instrumented	variable	(GIM	index)	included	in	the	IV	regression	for	predicting	the	outcome	
variable.	
The	reduced	form	results	for	the	IV	regressions	discussed	in	the	previous	two	subsections	
are	presented	 in	Table	6.	 In	Column	 (1),	 the	 linear	probability	 results	evidence	a	 trace	of	 the	
positive	relationship	between	resistance	and	the	 instrumented	GIM	index	through	both	of	 the	
GIM	instruments.	Moreover,	this	indirect	effect	is	statistically	significant	(at	the	one	percent	level)	
for	the	peers	GIM	instrument.	This	instrumental	variable	was	previously	shown	to	be	the	stronger	
of	the	two	sources	of	exogenous	variation	for	the	GIM	index,	even	though	the	effect	for	the	HQ	
GIM	 instrument	 was	 also	 shown	 to	 be	 statistically	 significant,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 over‐
                                                            
15	 Bates	 and	 Becher	 (2017)	 account	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 classified	 board,	 only	 one	 of	 24	 components	
comprising	 the	 GIM	 index,	 but,	 unlike	 Bates,	 Becher,	 and	 Lemmon	 (2008)	 and	Amihud	 et	 al	 (2017)	 in	
contexts	 other	 than	 for	 predicting	 resistance,	 do	 not	 treat	 a	 classified	 board	 as	 a	 suspect	 endogenous	
variable.	Of	course,	the	downside	of	requiring	data	for	the	GIM	index	is	that	our	sample	of	bids	is	smaller	
than	that	of	both	Schwert	(2000)	and	Bates	and	Becher	(2017).	However,	apart	from	firm	size,	the	effects	
of	the	other	variables	in	predicting	resistance	are	generally	consistent	with	those	shown	in	these	and	other	
studies.	Furthermore,	a	smaller	sample	of	bids	makes	it	manageable	for	us	to	use	primary	(news)	sources	
to	cleanly	search	each	and	every	bid	for	any	evidence	of	resistance,	something	that	Schwert	(2000)	does	
not	do	at	all	and	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	only	do	partially.							
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identification	 was	 categorically	 ruled	 out.	 A	 similar	 trace	 of	 the	 direct	 relationship	 between	
resistance	and	the	instrumented	GIM	index	is	also	evident	in	the	reduced	form	results	in	Column	
(2).	 Here,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 indirect	 effect	 is	 only	 slightly	 weaker	 than	 that	 in	 Column	 (1)	 is	
consistent	with	the	IV	linear	probability	results	after	including	the	bid	lambda	as	an	additional	
variable	for	predicting	resistance.	
In	Columns	(3)	and	(4),	the	parallel,	reduced	form	results	for	the	IV	probit	regressions	
also	provide	further	evidence	that,	with	exogenous	sources	of	variation,	a	higher	GIM	index	 is	
more	likely	to	lead	to	resistance.	
	
4.	 The	GIM	index	and	resistance:	Robustness	and	other	considerations	
	 The	results	in	the	preceding	section	seemingly	provide	strong	evidence	in	support	of	a	
positive	causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	index	to	resistance.	However,	it	is	possible	that	
the	causal	relationship	depends	on	a	specific	(1)	construct	for	the	GIM	instruments,	(2)	measure	
for	the	GIM	index,	(3)	subset	of	components	from	the	GIM	index,	and	(4)	endpoint	chosen	for	the	
analysis,	relative	to	when	RiskMetrics	stopped	collecting	data	for	each	and	every	component	of	
the	GIM	index.	
4.1.	 Rolling	vs	fixed	GIM	instruments	
	 We	construct	the	GIM	instruments	in	such	a	way	that	both	roll	forward	each	firm	year	
from	many	firm	years	in	the	past.	However,	to	increase	the	plausibility	of	both	being	sufficiently	
pre‐determined	(exogenous)	with	respect	to	a	future	bid,	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	also	propose	fixing	
the	peers	and	HQ	GIM	instruments	from	the	earliest	available	firm	year,	which	typically	equates	
to	1990	for	GIM	index	data	from	RiskMetrics.		
We	 therefore	 repeat	 the	 preceding	 analysis	 using	 fixed,	 instead	 of	 rolling,	 GIM	
instruments.	The	results,	presented	in	Table	7,	provide	evidence	in	further	support	of	a	positive	
causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	index	to	resistance	in	so	far	as	the	causal	relationship	
does	 not	 depend	 on	 a	 specific	 construct	 for	 the	 GIM	 instruments.	Moreover,	 using	 fixed	 GIM	
instruments	does	not	substantially	alter	results	from	the	analysis	to	follow,	for	which	we	continue	
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to	use	rolling	instruments.	Most	of	the	other	results	from	using	fixed	instruments	are	presented	
in	Tables	A1‐A4	of	the	Appendix.	
4.2.	 Additive	vs	binary	GIM	index	
	 Summing	across	the	24	components	of	the	GIM	index	to	produce	a	continuous	measure	
could	be	problematic	for	several	reasons.	First,	if	certain	components	of	the	GIM	index	are	more	
potent	than	the	rest	(see	Bebchuk	et	al,	2009,	and	the	next	subsection)	then	the	need	arises	for	a,	
perhaps,	 just	as	arbitrary	substitute	 for	equal	weights	 in	 the	summation.	Second,	a	GIM	 index	
above	a	certain	(so‐called	‘dictatorship’)	threshold	could	be	just	as	potent	as	one	higher	up	in	the	
distribution	(see	Gompers	et	al,	2003).	Third,	 these	measurement	 issues	could	be	particularly	
problematic	 when	 relying	 on	 exogenous	 sources	 of	 variation	 for	 an	 additive	 GIM	 index	 (see	
Karpoff	et	al,	2017).		
We	therefore	repeat	the	preceding	analysis	using	a	binary,	instead	of	additive,	GIM	index.	
Following	Masulis	et	al	(2007)	and	Harford	et	al	(2012),	GIM	dictatorship	is	a	dummy	variable	
identifying	a	firm	year	with	an	additive	GIM	index	above	the	median	for	all	firms	in	that	year.	For	
GIM	dictatorship,	we	 substitute	 the	 IV	 regressions	used	previously	 for	otherwise	 identical	bi‐
probit	regressions.	However,	here,	the	bid	lambda	is	unchanged	from	that	generated	previously	
in	reduced	form,	using	rolling	or	fixed	GIM	instruments.	The	results,	presented	in	Table	8,	provide	
evidence	 in	 further	 support	 of	 a	 positive	 causal	 relationship	 running	 from	 the	 GIM	 index	 to	
resistance	in	so	far	as	the	causal	relationship	also	does	not	depend	on	a	specific	measure	for	the	
GIM	index.	However,	the	positive	correlation	between	the	bid	lambda	and	GIM	index	is	evidently	
weaker	for	the	binary	measure.	This	suggests	that	a	threshold	based	on	the	median	GIM	index	in	
a	given	year	is	insufficient	for	detecting	that	the	outright,	deterrent	effect	of	a	higher	GIM	index	is	
likely	to	be	decreasing	in	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	a	firm.	
4.3.	 BCF	vs	KSW	index	
	 Bebchuk	et	al	(2009)	argue	that	6	components	(including	classified	board,	supermajority	
amendment,	and	poison	pill,	but	excluding	fair	price	amendment)	from	the	GIM	index	are	more	
potent	than	the	rest	as	to	warrant	a	sub‐index	(BCF	index).	However,	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	find	
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that,	when	instrumented,	a	higher	BCF	index	and	a	higher	sub‐index	comprised	of	the	other	16	
components	(KSW	index)	are	both	more	likely	to	deter	a	bid,	although	the	effect	of	adding	one	
more	component	to	the	BCF	index	is	greater	than	when	doing	so	for	the	KSW	index.		
We	therefore	repeat	the	preceding	analysis	after	substituting	the	BCF	and	KSW	indexes,	
both	independently	and	simultaneously,	for	the	GIM	index.	Here,	we	construct	separate	sets	of	
peers	and	HQ	instruments	corresponding	to	the	BCF	and	KSW	indexes,	but	in	an	identical	way	to	
those	 for	 the	GIM	index.	The	results,	presented	 in	Tables	9	(BCF	 index	alone),	10	(KSW	index	
alone),	and	11	(BCF	and	KSW	indexes	together),	and	Tables	A1‐A3,	respectively,	of	the	Appendix,	
provide	evidence	in	further	support	of	a	positive	causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	index	
to	resistance	in	so	far	as	the	causal	relationship	depends	on	a	subset	of	components	from	the	GIM	
index,	specifically	those	represented	by	the	KSW	index.	As	previously,	we	infer	from	the	results	
that,	in	general,	more	valuable	information	in	the	hands	of	only	one	bidder,	and	management,	(a	
higher	bid	lambda)	makes	it	more	likely	a	bid	will	proceed	and	face	resistance.	However,	here,	a	
higher	BCF	(KSW)	index	is	seemingly	more	likely	to	deter	a	bid	no	matter	how	(the	less)	valuable	
is	this	private	information.	If	so,	when	predicting	resistance	in	the	event	of	a	bid,	more	diminished	
variation	in	the	BCF	index	might	account	for	the	weaker	exogenous	sources	of	variation	for	this	
particular	 sub‐index,	 and	 hence	 an	 unreliable	 test	 of	 endogeneity,	 as	 compared	 to	 when	
predicting	a	bid.		
While	 there	might	 not	 be	 to	 be	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 BCF	 index	 and	 the	
likelihood	 of	 management	 resistance,	 both	 sub‐indices	 matter	 for	 outright,	 bid	 deterrence	
(consistent	with	the	findings	of	Karpoff	et	al,	2017),	and	the	deterrent	effect	of	a	higher,	BCF	index	
is	unrelated	to	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	a	firm.	These	findings	therefore	support	
the	 claim	 by	 Bebchuk	 et	 al	 (2009)	 that	 their	 index	 quantifies	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 firm’s	
antitakeover	 provisions	 have	 an	 especially	 potent,	 deterrent	 effect.	 It	 makes	 no	 difference	
whether	the	GIM	index	is	replaced	with	the	sub‐indices	separately	or	jointly.	
Interestingly,	should	our	decision	to	exclude	dual	class,	financial,	and	utility	stocks	more	
likely	explain	the	larger	first	stage	IV	effect	for	the	peers	GIM	instrument	in	comparison	to	that	in	
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Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	then	this	difference	seemingly	matters	only	for	the	subset	of	components	
from	the	GIM	index	represented	by	the	KSW	index.	Moreover,	the	first	stage	IV	effect	for	the	peers	
KSW	 instrument	 also	 pre‐determines	 the	 BCF	 index,	 whereas	 no	 such	 co‐determination	 of	
exogenous	sources	of	variation	is	evident	for	the	KSW	index.	
4.4.	 2012	vs	2009	endpoint	
	 RiskMetrics	stopped	collecting	data	for	each	and	every	component	of	the	GIM	index	after	
2006.16	However,	similar	to	some	of	the	analysis	of	Karpoff	et	al	(2017),	we	forward	fill	the	latest	
available	data	for	the	GIM	index	to	reduce	the	omission	of	many	later	bids.	This	strategy	should	
have	little	effect	on	the	GIM	instruments,	which	either	roll	forward	from	many	firm	years	in	the	
past	or	are	fixed	from	the	earliest	available	data.	However,	when	it	comes	to	the	actual	GIM	index,	
data	filling	to	as	far	forward	as	a	2011	firm	year,	for	a	2012	bid,	is	potentially	problematic	in	so	
far	as	being	distanced	from	a	typical	maximum	forward	fill	of	two	firm	years	for	gaps	between	
firm	years	while	the	data	was	still	being	collected.	
	 We	therefore	repeat	the	preceding	analysis	after	enforcing	a	forward	fill	of	the	data	for	
the	GIM	index	to	no	further	than	a	2008	firm	year,	for	a	2009	bid.	The	results,	not	presented	for	
reasons	of	brevity	(but	available	upon	request),	provide	evidence	in	further	support	of	a	positive	
causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	index	to	resistance	in	so	far	as	the	causal	relationship	
does	not	depend	on	the	endpoint	chosen	for	the	analysis.	Furthermore,	the	first	stage	IV	effects	
for	both	of	the	GIM	instruments	are	similar	in	magnitude	to	those	discussed	previously	for	the	
2012	endpoint.	
	
5.	 Initial	premium	and	resistance	
Finding	further	evidence	in	support	of	a	positive	causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	
index	to	resistance	strengthens	the	earlier	suggestion	that	from	the	perspective	of	the	GIM	index	
                                                            
16	Of	the	two	sub‐indexes,	these	stoppages	affect	the	KSW	index,	but	not	the	BCF	index.	Like	Karpoff	et	al	
(2017),	we	opt	not	to	update	the	data	for	the	BCF	index	beyond	the	point	at	which	RiskMetrics	stopped	
updating	the	data	for	the	GIM	and	KSW	indexes.	Moreover,	the	BCF	index	was	previously	found	to	be	prone	
to	 more	 diminished	 variation,	 and	 hence	 weaker	 exogenous	 sources	 of	 variation,	 when	 predicting	
resistance	in	the	event	of	a	bid.						
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at	least	the	dominant	motive	for	resistance	is	management	entrenchment,	and	not	pursuit	of	a	
better	outcome	for	shareholders.	That	 is,	 in	general	and	independent	of	the	initial	premium,	a	
higher	 GIM	 index	 does	 not	 substitute	 for	 resistance	 by	 possibly	 affording	management	more	
bargaining	power	for	price	improvement.	However,	it	is	also	evident	throughout	the	preceding	
analysis	that,	independent	of	the	GIM	index,	resistance	is	more	likely	to	be	associated	with	a	bid	
offering	a	 lower	initial	premium.	Therefore,	our	intention	in	the	final	part	of	the	analysis	 is	to	
reconcile	this	seemingly	conflicting	evidence	in	support	of	the	price	improvement	hypothesis	for	
explaining	resistance.	The	foregoing	analysis,	the	results	from	which	are	presented	in	Table	12	
(and	 Table	 A4	 of	 the	 Appendix),	 rests	 on	 relaxing	 the	 implicit	 assumptions	 in	 the	 preceding	
analysis	that	the	initial	premium	is	exogenous	to	resistance	and	the	initial	premium	and	the	GIM	
index	are	not	co‐determined.	
	 To	begin	with,	it	is	hard	to	find	convincing	support,	beyond	that	in	Jennings	and	Mazzeo	
(1993),	 for	 the	price	 improvement	hypothesis	when	predicting	 resistance	using	 the	observed	
initial	premium	(see	Walkling	and	Long,	1984;	Cotter	and	Zenner,	1994;	Bates	and	Becher,	2017).	
However,	 Bates	 and	 Becher	 (2017)	 contend	 that	 the	 unexplained	 or	 abnormal	 part	 of	 the	
observed	initial	premium	represents	a	better	proxy	for	the	perceived	quality	of	a	bid.	They	find	
support	 for	 the	 price	 improvement	 hypothesis	 only	 after	 substituting	 this	 measure	 for	 the	
observed	 initial	 premium.	We	 therefore	 first	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 abnormal	
initial	premium	and	resistance	using	an	IV	linear	probability	regression	for	predicting	resistance	
that	is	otherwise	identical	to	those	before	with	rolling	GIM	instruments.	To	generate	an	abnormal	
initial	premium	we	regress	the	observed	initial	premium	on	all	of	the	variables	in	the	first	stage	
of	the	IV	regression	in	Column	(2)	and	extract	the	residual.	Also	including	the	GIM	instruments	
and	 bid	 lambda	 (from	 before)	 ensures	 that	 any	 endogenous	 co‐determination	 and	 sample	
selection	bias	are	dealt	with	in	the	same	way	in	the	standalone	regression	in	Column	(1)	for	the	
observed	 initial	 premium.	 Consistent	 also	 with	 treatment	 in	 the	 IV	 regression	 we	 bootstrap	
standard	errors	because	of	manual	adding	of	the	bid	lambda.			
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To	meet	the	need	for	an	exclusion	restriction	we	follow	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	in	adding	
the	 variable,	 pre‐bid	 price	 to	 high	 price	 (previously	 described	 in	 Section	 2.2),	 only	 to	 the	
regression	for	the	observed	premium.	Baker	et	al	(2012)	argue	that	this	nominal	ratio	of	past	
prices	is	a	plausible	benchmark	for	the	observed	initial	premium.	However,	this	variable	is	also	
likely	to	be	a	source	of	variation	for	the	observed	initial	premium	that	is	plausibly	exogenous	to	
resistance.17	This	is	because,	given	the	significant	effect	for	resistance	on	the	bid	announcement	
return	in	Section	2.3,	the	market	is	unlikely	to	have	anticipated,	and	hence	already	priced	in,	the	
effect	of	resistance.	Also,	given	that	we	net	off	the	effects	for	the	firm‐specific	stock	return,	GIM	
instruments,	 and	 bid	 lambda,	 it	 is	 less	 conceivable	 that	 the	 nominal	 ratio	 of	 past	 prices	 is	
correlated	 to	 a	 problematic	 degree	with	 unobservable	 factors	 also	 related	 to	 resistance.	 Like	
Baker	et	al	(2012)	and	Bates	and	Becher	(2017),	it	is	also	evident	from	our	results	that	all	other	
things	 equal	 a	 higher	52	week	high	price	 is	 statistically	matched	by	 a	higher	observed	 initial	
premium.	Interestingly,	however,	the	results	for	the	GIM	instruments	reveal	no	significant	trace	
of	a	direct	causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	index	to	the	observed	initial	premium.	This	
finding	stands	in	contrast	to	the	opposing	positive	causal	relationships	found	by	Cain	et	al	(2017)	
following	 greater	 protection	 from	 State	 antitakeover	 laws	 and	 Cuñat	 et	 al	 (2017)	 following	
removal	of	a	defense	from	the	corporate	charter.	
The	results	 for	 the	second	stage	of	 the	 IV	regression	 in	Column	(3)	show	that	 like	 the	
observed	 initial	 premium	 before	 the	 abnormal	 initial	 premium	 is	 statistically	 negatively	
correlated	with	resistance.	That	is,	resistance	is	significantly	more	likely	to	be	associated	with	not	
only	a	bid	offering	a	lower	observed	initial	premium,	but	also	the	perception	of	an	abnormally	
lower	quality	bid.	While	this	result	could	therefore	possibly	provide	further	support	for	the	price	
improvement	hypothesis	for	explaining	resistance	(as	suggested	by	Bates	and	Becher,	2017),	the	
result	also	reveals	that	the	unexplained	part	of	the	observed	initial	premium	is	an	unobservable	
factor	 that	 hinders	 a	 reliable	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 observed	 initial	
                                                            
17	Baker	et	al	(2012)	go	on	to	use	this	variable	as	an	instrument	for	the	observed	premium	in	a	regression	
for	the	bidder’s	announcement	return.	
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premium	 and	 resistance.	 Moreover,	 a	 statistically	 significant	 effect	 for	 the	 abnormal	 initial	
premium	 is	also	evident	 in	 the	 second	stage	of	 another	 IV	 regression	 in	Column	(5),	 the	only	
difference	being	that	the	observed	and	abnormal	initial	premiums	are	included	simultaneously	
instead	of	as	substitutes.	That	the	abnormal	initial	premium	is	statistically	significant	even	after	
netting	off	the	effect	for	the	observed	initial	premium	strengthens	the	need	to	treat	the	observed	
initial	premium	as	another	suspect	endogenous	variable.	
We	therefore	next	instrument	for	the	observed	initial	premium	using	the	same	Baker	et	
al	 (2012)	 variable,	 pre‐bid	 price	 to	 high	 price,	 which	 in	 the	 prior	 non‐instrumented	 context	
served	only	as	an	exclusion	restriction.	The	results	for	the	second	stage	of	this	again	otherwise	
identical	 IV	 regression	 in	 Column	 (7)	 provide	 strong	 statistical	 support	 against	 there	 being	 a	
negative,	or	any,	causal	 relationship	running	 from	the	observed	 initial	premium	to	resistance,	
including	those	from	the	tests	of	 instrument	validity	and	the	need	for	an	exogenous	source	of	
variation	 for	 the	 observed	 initial	 premium.18	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 co‐
determination	from	the	instruments	in	the	first	stages	for	the	observed	initial	premium	and	GIM	
index	in	Columns	(1)	and	(6)	respectively.	That	is,	no	matter	the	direction,	there	is	no	trace	of	a	
direct	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 GIM	 index	 and	 observed	 initial	 premium.	 Lastly,	 the	
reduced	form	results	in	Column	(8)	for	the	same	IV	regression	accord	with	the	main	results	in	
revealing	no	 statistical	 trace	 of	 a	 direct	 causal	 relationship	 running	 from	 the	 observed	 initial	
premium	to	resistance.	This	reduced	form	result	is	consistent	with	the	corresponding	univariate	
result	in	Section	2.2.	
Hence,	 in	 the	 instrumented	 context	 of	 this	 analysis,	we	 infer	 that	 resistance	 is	 not,	 in	
general,	caused	by	the	perception	of	a	lower	quality	bid.	Although	there	is	extant	evidence	that	
resistance	can	lead	to	price	improvement	for	a	lower	quality	bid	(see	Dimopoulos	and	Sacchetto,	
                                                            
18	This	result	is	at	odds	with	that	of	Jennings	and	Mazzeo	(1993)	for	an	earlier	sample	of	bids.	Using	either	
a	single	regression	or	simultaneous	regressions,	they	find	a	significant	negative	relationship	between	the	
observed	 initial	 premium	and	 resistance.	However,	 the	 only	 variable	 that	 Jennings	 and	Mazzeo	 (1993)	
include	in	the	simultaneous	regression	for	the	observed	initial	premium,	number	of	analysts	following	the	
target,	is	also	included	in	the	simultaneous	regression	for	predicting	resistance.	Moreover,	this	variable	is	
insignificant	for	the	observed	initial	premium,	but	significant	for	predicting	resistance.       
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2014;	Bates	and	Becher,	2017),	our	findings	suggest	that	price	improvement	is	unlikely	to	be	the	
dominant	motive	for	resistance.	That	is,	a	greater	potential	for	price	improvement	is	unlikely	to	
cause	managers	to	resist	a	bid.	Instead,	undiminished	evidence	throughout	the	analysis	in	this	
section	of	a	positive	causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	index	to	resistance	makes	it	hard	
to	challenge	a	management	entrenchment	motive.	
	
6.	 Conclusion	
	 In	this	study,	we	examine	whether	there	is	a	causal	relationship	that	runs	from	the	GIM	
index	to	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance.	With	an	exogenous	source	of	variation	for	the	
GIM	index,	we	reason	that	this	is	possible,	either	because	a	higher	GIM	index	is	a	more	powerful	
substitute	 for	 management	 resistance	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 eliciting	 or	 bargaining	 for	 a	 higher	
quality	offer	(negative	relationship),	or	because	a	higher	GIM	index	is	a	manifestation	of	managers	
that	are	already	relatively	entrenched	and,	thus,	more	inclined	to	abuse	management	resistance	
for	the	purpose	of	reinforcing	this	position	(positive	relationship).	Using	an	IV	regression	and	
sources	of	variation	for	the	GIM	index	that	have	strong	validity	and	are	plausibly	exogenous	to	
the	likelihood	of	management	resistance,	we	find	robust	support	for	the	notion	that	managerial	
entrenchment	 causes	managers	 to	 resist	 a	 bid,	 rather	 than	 that	 the	motive	 for	 management	
resistance	is	to	compensate	for	a	lower	GIM	index.		
As	 a	 more	 head‐on	 test	 of	 the	 latter,	 price	 improvement	 motive,	 we	 jointly	 examine	
whether	 there	 is	 a	 causal	 relationship	 that	 runs	 from	 the	 initial	premium	 to	 the	 likelihood	of	
management	resistance.	With	a	source	of	variation	for	the	initial	premium	that	also	has	strong	
validity	 and	 is	 plausibly	 exogenous	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	management	 resistance,	 our	 findings	
suggest	that	a	lower	quality	offer	does	not	cause	managers	to	resist	a	bid.	Our	conclusions	from	a	
direct,	ex‐ante	analysis	of	the	hypothesized	motives	for	management	resistance	seem	to	be	borne	
out	by	an	indirect,	ex‐post	analysis,	in	which	the	wealth	effect	for	shareholders	and	completion	
rate	for	a	higher	quality	offer	are	evidently	worse	for	a	bid	that	faces	resistance	from	managers.		
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We	specifically	extend	the	work	of	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	by	treating	the	GIM	index	as	a	
suspect	endogenous	variable	for	jointly	explaining	outright	bid	deterrence	and	the	likelihood	of	
management	 resistance	 in	 the	event	of	 a	bid.	This	 rounding	off	has	 relevance	because,	as	our	
findings	suggest,	the	greater	is	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	a	firm,	the	weaker	is	the	
deterrent	effect	of	a	higher	GIM	index.	Moreover,	in	the	event	of	a	firm	becoming	the	target	of	a	
takeover	attempt	it	is	largely	at	management’s	discretion	as	to	whether,	and	by	what	means,	to	
resist	 the	bid.	 In	 contrast,	 outright	 bid	deterrence	 is	more	 about	 the	discretion	of	 a	 potential	
bidder.		
	 Our	 study	 is	 the	 first	 to	 establish	 beyond	 reasonable	 doubt	 whether	 it	 is	 price	
improvement	or	managerial	entrenchment	that	actually	causes	management	to	resist	a	bid.	With	
significant,	potentially	conflicting	stakes	for	shareholders	(less	willing	to	accept	a	lower	quality	
offer)	and	managers	(unwilling	to	accept	a	higher	quality	offer	at	the	expense	their	jobs),	and	a	
sizable	dataset	with	many	control	variables	 from	which	 it	 is	clearly	evident	 that	management	
resistance	matters	more	for	larger	firms,	the	evidence	that	we	present	in	this	paper	is	likely	to	be	
of	 interest	 to	 corporate	 legislators	 in	 considering	 imposing	 limits	on	managerial	discretion	 in	
response	to	the	threat	of	a	takeover.	
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Main,	variable	definitions	
Variable	 Definition	
Resistance	 Indicator	for	management	resistance,	which	is	equal	to	one	for	a	bid	that	
faces	any	form	of	management	resistance,	as	disclosed	in	news	sources	in	
the	Factiva	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	This	is	either	in	the	form	of	a	
public	 rejection,	 or	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 post‐offer	 defense,	 such	 as	 those	 –	
targeted	repurchase,	standstill	agreement,	litigation,	asset	restructuring,	
or	liability	restructuring	–	that	Ruback	(1987)	describes.			
Bid	 Indicator	for	a	bid,	which	is	equal	to	one	for	a	firm	year	with	a	bid	in	the	
Securities	Data	Company	(SDC)	Platinum	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	
Bids	 are	 dropped	 that	 are	 not	 an	 attempt	 to	 acquire	 in	 excess	 of	 fifty	
percent	 of	 a	 firm’s	 outstanding,	 common	 stock,	 bids	 are	 also	 dropped	
when	made	 by	management,	 and	 bids	 for	 the	 same	 firm	 are	 combined	
when	separated	by	up	to	260,	trading	days.	
Announcement	return	 Wealth	 effect	 for	 shareholders	 through	 to	 bid	 announcement,	 which	
(having	combined	bids	for	the	same	firm	when	separated	by	up	to	260,	
trading	 days)	 is	 the	 target	 firm’s	 stock	 return	 for	 the	 42,	 trading	 days	
before	 bid	 announcement	 (run‐up	 period),	 and	 through	 to	 bid	
announcement,	net	of	 the	stock	return	for	a	value‐weighted	 index	of	all	
firms	 in	 the	 Center	 for	 Research	 in	 Security	 Prices/Compustat	Merged	
(CCM)	database.	
Post‐announcement	return	 Wealth	effect	for	shareholders	through	to	post‐announcement,	which	does	
the	same	as	the	announcement	return,	but	through	to	the	trading	day	after	
bid	announcement.	
Post‐bid	return	 Wealth	effect	for	shareholders	through	to	post‐bid,	which	does	the	same	
as	the	announcement	return,	but	through	to	either	the	trading	day	after	
bid	completion,	or	up	to	260,	trading	days	after	non‐completion	(during	
which	period	there	are	no	further	bids	for	the	same	firm).	
Final	premium	 Actual	premium	offered	by	the	final	bidder,	which	(having	combined	bids	
for	the	same	firm	when	separated	by	up	to	260,	trading	days)	is	the	final,	
offer	price	in	the	SDC	Platinum	database,	over	the	target	firm’s	stock	price	
(adjusted	 for	 any	 splits,	 etc.),	 in	 the	 CCM	 database,	 before	 the	 run‐up	
period,	minus	one.	
Completed	 Indicator	for	bid	completion,	which	(having	combined	bids	for	the	same	
firm	when	separated	by	up	to	260,	trading	days)	is	equal	to	one	for	a	bid	
that	is	finally	in	the	SDC	Platinum	database	as	having	been	completed,	and	
to	zero	otherwise.	
Termination	fee	 Indicator	 for	 management	 commitment	 to	 closing	 out	 a	 bid	 with	 a	
termination	 fee,	which	 (having	 combined	 bids	 for	 the	 same	 firm	when	
separated	by	up	to	260,	trading	days)	is	equal	to	one	for	a	bid	that	at	any	
stage	in	the	SDC	Platinum	database	has	a	target	firm,	termination	fee,	and	
to	zero	otherwise.	
GIM	index	 Gompers,	Ishii,	and	Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	
antitakeover	provisions,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	adds	one	for	each	
antitakeover	 provision	 that	 a	 firm	 has	 out	 of	 twenty‐four	 –	 including	
staggered/classified	 board,	 supermajority	 amendment,	 fair	 price	
amendment,	and	poison	pill	–	from	RiskMetrics.	The	RiskMetrics	dataset	
is	available	for	1990‐2006,	and	the	data	is	forward	filled	during	intervals	
between	biannual,	or	triannual,	updates,	and	after	it	ends.	
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Variable	 Definition	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 Pseudo,	GIM	index	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms,	which	adds	proportions	for	
the	extent	to	which	a	cohort	of	at	least	three	firms	has	each	of	the	twenty‐
four,	antitakeover	provisions	of	 the	GIM	index,	and	which	rolls	 forward	
each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Cohort	firms,	which	exclude	the	
focus	 firm,	 and	 firms	 with	 a	 historic,	 two‐digit,	 Standard	 Industrial	
Classification	(SIC)	code	that	is	the	same	as	that	of	the	focus	firm,	have	a	
start	year	in	the	CCM	database,	after	having	combined	start	years	earlier	
than	1951,	 that	 is	 the	 same	as	 that	 of	 the	 focus	 firm.	This	pseudo,	GIM	
index	 is	 constructed	 in	 a	 similar	 way	 to	 that	 described	 by	 Karpoff,	
Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017).	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 Pseudo,	GIM	index	for	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	does	the	
same	as	 the	peers,	GIM	 index	(rolling),	but	 for	cohort	 firms	that	have	a	
Zone	Improvement	Plan	code	in	the	CCM	database	for	which	the	latitude	
and	 longitude	co‐ordinates	 locate	their	headquarters	within	a	100	mile,	
same	 State,	 radius	 of	 that	 of	 the	 focus	 firm.	 This	 pseudo,	 GIM	 index	 is	
constructed	in	a	similar	way	to	that	also	described	by	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	
Initial	premium	 Actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	which	does	the	same	as	the	
final	 premium,	 but	 with	 the	 initial,	 offer	 price,	 in	 the	 SDC	 Platinum	
database,	as	the	numerator.		
Pre‐bid	price	to	high	price	 Pseudo,	 initial	premium,	which	is	the	target	firm’s	stock	price	(adjusted	
for	any	splits,	etc.),	in	the	CCM	database,	before	the	run‐up	period	over	the	
target	firm’s	highest,	stock	price	for	up	to	260,	trading	days	before	the	run‐
up	 period,	minus	 one.	 This	 pseudo,	 initial	 premium	 is	 constructed	 in	 a	
similar	way	to	that	described	by	Baker,	Pan,	and	Wurgler	(2012).				
All	cash	 Indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	which	(having	combined	bids	for	the	same	
firm	when	separated	by	up	to	260,	trading	days)	is	equal	to	one	for	a	bid	
that	is	initially	in	the	SDC	Platinum	database	as	offering	only	cash,	and	to	
zero	otherwise.	
Size	 Size	of	a	firm’s	assets,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	the	book	value	of	a	
firm’s	total	assets,	in	the	CCM	database,	denoted	in	millions	of	real,	2012,	
US	dollars.	
Leverage	 Leverage	of	a	firm’s	capital,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	the	book	value	
of	a	firm’s	long‐term	debt,	in	the	CCM	database,	over	the	book	value	of	its	
total	assets.	
Market‐to‐book	 Market‐to‐book	ratio	for	a	firm’s	assets,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	
the	market	value	of	a	firm’s	total	assets	(before	the	run‐up	period	when	
this	 spills	 over	 into	 the	preceding	year),	 in	 the	CCM	database,	 over	 the	
book	value	of	its	total	assets.					
Tangibility	 Tangibility	of	a	firm’s	assets,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	the	book	value	
of	a	firm’s	property,	plant,	and	equipment,	before	depreciation,	in	the	CCM	
database,	over	the	book	value	of	its	total	assets.		
Liquidity	 Liquidity	of	a	firm’s	assets,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	the	book	value	
of	a	firm’s	working	capital,	in	the	CCM	database,	over	the	book	value	of	its	
total	assets.		
Sales	growth	 Growth	of	a	firm’s	sales,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	the	proportionate	
change	in	a	firm’s	annual	sales	in	the	CCM	database.			
ROA	 Return	on	a	firm’s	assets	(ROA),	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	a	firm’s	
operating	income,	before	depreciation,	in	the	CCM	database,	over	the	book	
value	of	its	total	assets.					
Stock	return	 Return	on	a	 firm’s	stock,	which,	with	a	 lag	of	one	year,	 is	a	 firm’s	stock	
return	 for	up	 to	260,	 trading	days	 (before	 the	 run‐up	period	when	 this	
spills	over	into	the	preceding	year),	net	of	the	return	for	a	value‐weighted	
index	of	all	firms	in	the	CCM	database.			
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Variable	 Definition	
Industry	concentration	 Concentration	 of	 a	 firm’s	 industry,	which,	with	 a	 lag	 of	 one	 year,	 adds	
squared	proportions	for	the	extent	to	which	each	of	at	least	three	firms,	
with	a	historic,	two‐digit,	SIC	code	that	is	the	same	as	that	of	the	focus	firm,	
and	the	focus	firm,	share	an	industry’s	annual	sales.		
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Tables	
Table	1	
Sample	
This	table	describes	the	sample.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper.	The	sample	
is	comprised	of	firm	years	for	which	the	twenty‐four,	antitakeover	provisions	of	the	Gompers,	Ishii,	and	
Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	are	available	from	RiskMetrics,	and	to	an	extent	that	these	can	roll	forward	
each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years	for	constructing	the	pseudo,	GIM	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	
firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms.	The	RiskMetrics	dataset	is	available	for	1990‐2006,	and	the	
data	is	forward	filled	during	intervals	between	biannual,	or	triannual,	updates,	and	after	it	ends.	Firms	are	
dropped	that	are	not	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	(CCM)	database.	Firm	
years	for	1990‐2012	are	dropped	that	have	two,	or	more,	classes	of	common	stock	in	the	CCM	database,	as	
are	 those	 that	 have	 a	 historic,	 two‐digit,	 Standard	 Industrial	 Classification	 code	 for	 either	 a	 financial	
industry	(including	real‐estate),	or	a	regulated	utility	industry.	The	final,	unbalanced	panel	of	firm	years	for	
1993‐2012,	with	a	 lag	of	one	year	 for	the	other	variables	(including	the	actual,	GIM	 index)	that	are	not	
conditional	 on	 a	 bid,	 is	merged	with	 bids	 in	 the	 Securities	Data	 Company	 Platinum	database.	 Bids	 are	
dropped	that	are	not	an	attempt	to	acquire	in	excess	of	fifty	percent	of	a	firm’s	outstanding,	common	stock,	
bids	 are	 also	 dropped	 when	 made	 by	 management,	 and	 bids	 for	 the	 same	 firm	 are	 combined	 when	
separated	by	up	 to	 260,	 trading	days.	 Column	 (1)	 is	 the	 annual	 number	 of	 bids	 that	 face	management	
resistance,	Column	(2)	is	the	annual	number	of	bids,	and	Column	(3)	is	the	annual	percentage	of	bids	that	
face	management	 resistance.	 Column	 (4)	 is	 the	 annual	 number	 of	 firms,	 and	Column	 (5)	 is	 the	 annual	
percentage	of	firms	that	are	the	target	of	a	bid.										
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Year	 Resistance	#	 Bids	#	 Resistance	%	 Firms	#	 Target	firms	%	
1993	 3	 9	 33.3	 753	 1.2	
1994	 5	 22	 22.7	 854	 2.6	
1995	 10	 33	 30.3	 845	 3.9	
1996	 10	 36	 27.8	 899	 4.0	
1997	 10	 50	 20.0	 876	 5.7	
1998	 6	 55	 10.9	 873	 6.3	
1999	 15	 103	 14.6	 1,192	 8.6	
2000	 9	 88	 10.2	 1,068	 8.2	
2001	 4	 43	 9.3	 1,052	 4.1	
2002	 3	 17	 17.7	 1,008	 1.7	
2003	 4	 30	 13.3	 1,264	 2.4	
2004	 10	 43	 23.3	 1,243	 3.5	
2005	 15	 79	 19.0	 1,344	 5.9	
2006	 11	 72	 15.3	 1,278	 5.6	
2007	 11	 93	 11.8	 1,304	 7.1	
2008	 19	 52	 36.5	 1,203	 4.3	
2009	 5	 41	 12.2	 1,134	 3.6	
2010	 7	 38	 18.4	 1,099	 3.5	
2011	 10	 44	 22.7	 1,064	 4.1	
2012	 6	 47	 12.8	 1,022	 4.6	
Total	 173	 995	 17.4	 21,375	 4.7	
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Table	2	
Main	variables	
This	table	presents	descriptive	statistics	for	the	main	variables.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	
is	described	in	Table	1.	Panel	A	is	for	the	sample	of	bids,	which	is	split	between	bids	that	do	and	do	not	face	management	resistance.	Columns	(1)	and	(3)	are	variable	
means	for	the	resistance	and	no	resistance	subgroups,	respectively,	and	Columns	(2)	and	(4)	are	variable,	standard	deviations	for	the	resistance	and	no	resistance	
subgroups,	respectively.	Column	(1)	also	indicates	whether	the	difference	between	the	variable	means	for	the	resistance	and	no	resistance	subgroups	is	statistically	
significant.	The	variables	begin	with	those	for	bid	outcomes	for	shareholders,	which	are	the	wealth	effect	(stock	return)	through	to	bid	announcement,	the	wealth	
effect	through	to	post‐announcement,	the	wealth	effect	through	to	post‐bid,	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	final	bidder,	the	indicator	for	bid	completion,	and	the	
indicator	for	management	commitment	to	closing	out	a	bid	with	a	termination	fee.	These	variables	are	followed	by	those	for	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	
provisions,	both	 in	actual	 form	(GIM	index),	and	 in	 the	 instrumental‐variable	(IV)	 form	of	 the	pseudo,	GIM	indices	 for	same‐age	(peer)	 firms	and	headquarters‐
proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	roll	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	These	variables	are	followed	by	those	for	bid	structure,	which	are	the	actual	
premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	both	in	actual	form,	and	in	the	IV	form	of	the	pseudo	one,	pre‐bid	price	to	high	price,	and	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid.	The	
variables	end	with	those	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	Panel	B	is	for	the	sample	of	firm	years,	which	is	split	between	firm	years	with	and	without	a	bid.	Columns	
(6)	and	(8)	are	variable	means	for	the	bid	and	no	bid	subgroups,	respectively,	and	Columns	(7)	and	(9)	are	variable,	standard	deviations	for	the	bid	and	no	bid	
subgroups,	respectively.	Column	(6)	also	indicates	whether	the	difference	between	the	variable	means	for	the	bid	and	no	bid	subgroups	is	statistically	significant.	
The	variables	are	those	in	Panel	A	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.												
	 Panel	A	 Panel	B	
	 Resistance	 No	resistance	 	 Bid	 No	bid	 	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	
Variable	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	
Announcement	return	 0.130***	 0.252	 0.220	 0.249	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Post‐announcement	return	 0.195***	 0.224	 0.256	 0.244	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Post‐bid	return	 0.181***	 0.549	 0.270	 0.319	 985	 	 	 	 	 	
Final	premium	 0.479	 0.369	 0.442	 0.373	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Completed	 0.642***	 	 0.946	 	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Termination	fee	 0.503***	 	 0.876	 	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
GIM	index	 9.376**	 2.436	 8.878	 2.635	 995	 8.965	 2.607	 9.037	 2.687	 21,375	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 9.115***	 1.100	 8.787	 1.079	 992	 8.844***	 1.089	 9.020	 1.103	 21,249	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 9.082*	 0.926	 8.927	 0.945	 976	 8.954***	 0.943	 9.064	 0.919	 21,053	
Initial	premium	 0.341***	 0.304	 0.438	 0.371	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre‐bid	price	to	high	price	 ‐0.244	 0.203	 ‐0.245	 0.202	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
All	cash	 0.566***	 	 0.454	 	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Size	 3,237.3	 6,350.0	 2,548.8	 6,254.3	 993	 2,668.8***	 6,273.3	 5,791.8	 24,009.3	 21,361	
Leverage	 0.198	 0.162	 0.184	 0.179	 992	 0.187	 0.176	 0.179	 0.157	 21,358	
Market‐to‐book	 1.539***	 0.795	 1.780	 0.979	 987	 1.738***	 0.954	 1.943	 1.374	 21,340	
Tangibility	 0.589**	 0.356	 0.522	 0.395	 980	 0.533	 0.389	 0.553	 0.374	 21,242	
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Table	2	(continued)	
Main	variables 
	 Panel	A	 Panel	B	
	 Resistance	 No	resistance	 	 Bid	 No	bid	 	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	
Variable	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	
Liquidity	 0.196**	 0.187	 0.236	 0.211	 993	 0.229	 0.207	 0.225	 0.201	 21,361	
Sales	growth	 0.023	 0.164	 0.161	 2.282	 993	 0.137**	 2.076	 0.085	 0.659	 21,333	
ROA	 0.109	 0.099	 0.115	 0.159	 983	 0.114***	 0.150	 0.134	 0.109	 21,296	
Stock	return	 ‐0.114	 0.445	 ‐0.116	 0.450	 995	 ‐0.115***	 0.448	 ‐0.024	 0.429	 21,358	
Industry	concentration	 0.094	 0.069	 0.095	 0.075	 994	 0.095***	 0.074	 0.107	 0.093	 21,364	
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Table	3	
Relationship	between	management	resistance	and	bid	outcomes	for	shareholders		
This	table	presents	average,	marginal	effects	for	the	relationship	between	management	resistance	and	bid	outcomes	for	shareholders.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	
provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	is	described	in	Table	1.	Column	(1)	is	a	linear	regression	for	the	wealth	effect	(stock	return)	through	to	bid	
announcement	on	the	indicator	for	management	resistance,	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index),	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	and	
other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators).	Columns	(2),	(3),	and	(4)	do	the	same	as	Column	(1),	but	for	the	wealth	effect	through	to	post‐
announcement,	the	wealth	effect	through	to	post‐bid,	and	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	final	bidder,	respectively.	Column	(5)	 is	a	probit	regression	for	the	
likelihood	of	bid	completion	on	the	indicator	for	management	resistance,	the	GIM	index,	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	final	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	
bid,	and	the	other	variables.	Column	(6)	does	the	same	as	Column	(5),	but	for	the	likelihood	of	management	commitment	to	closing	out	a	bid	with	a	termination	fee,	
and	with	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	instead	of	with	that	offered	by	the	final	bidder.	Robust,	standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	
the	marginal	effects.	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.       	
	 Linear	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	
Announcement	
return	
Post‐
announcement	
return	 Post‐bid	return	 Final	premium	 Completed	 Termination	fee	
Resistance	 ‐0.0929***	 ‐0.0642***	 ‐0.0888**	 0.0471	 ‐0.3006***	 ‐0.3476***	
	 (0.0217)	 (0.0198)	 (0.0436)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0363)	 (0.0396)	
GIM	index	 ‐0.0021	 0.0013	 0.0028	 0.0015	 ‐0.0030	 ‐0.0025	
	 (0.0031)	 (0.0030)	 (0.0047)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0034)	 (0.0043)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 	 	 0.1663***	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.0360)	
Final	premium	 	 	 	 	 0.1813***	 	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.0311)	 	
All	cash	 0.0387**	 0.0447***	 ‐0.0013	 ‐0.0249	 ‐0.0232	 ‐0.0065	
	 (0.0170)	 (0.0166)	 (0.0267)	 (0.0265)	 (0.0187)	 (0.0242)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0084	 ‐0.0124*	 ‐0.0104	 ‐0.0182	 ‐0.0083	 0.0163*	
	 (0.0071)	 (0.0072)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0112)	 (0.0070)	 (0.0097)	
Leverage	 0.1383**	 0.1520***	 0.0384	 0.1396*	 ‐0.0712	 0.0545	
	 (0.0536)	 (0.0493)	 (0.0958)	 (0.0752)	 (0.0556)	 (0.0777)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0130	 ‐0.0168	 ‐0.0126	 ‐0.0154	 0.0160	 0.0171	
	 (0.0116)	 (0.0113)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0155)	 (0.0138)	 (0.0166)	
Tangibility	 ‐0.0649**	 ‐0.0654**	 ‐0.0103	 ‐0.0970***	 0.0556**	 0.0176	
	 (0.0271)	 (0.0254)	 (0.0431)	 (0.0374)	 (0.0272)	 (0.0330)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0840	 ‐0.0401	 ‐0.0014	 ‐0.0696	 0.0221	 0.0133	
	 (0.0600)	 (0.0610)	 (0.0804)	 (0.0892)	 (0.0493)	 (0.0670)	
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Table	3	(continued)	
Relationship	between	management	resistance	and	bid	outcomes	for	shareholders 
	 Linear	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	
Announcement	
return	
Post‐
announcement	
return	 Post‐bid	return	 Final	premium	 Completed	 Termination	fee	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0099***	 ‐0.0115***	 ‐0.0120***	 ‐0.0087***	 0.0019	 0.0042	
	 (0.0011)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0015)	 (0.0016)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0031)	
ROA	 0.1758	 0.1364	 0.2445	 0.0521	 ‐0.0104	 0.0777	
	 (0.1391)	 (0.1279)	 (0.1855)	 (0.1754)	 (0.0791)	 (0.1064)	
Stock	return	 ‐0.0676**	 ‐0.0571**	 ‐0.0676*	 ‐0.1321***	 0.0047	 0.0174	
	 (0.0272)	 (0.0275)	 (0.0373)	 (0.0456)	 (0.0235)	 (0.0297)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.1156	 ‐0.0908	 ‐0.1718	 ‐0.0632	 0.0437	 ‐0.5143***	
	 (0.0962)	 (0.0912)	 (0.1406)	 (0.1617)	 (0.1324)	 (0.1495)	
Constant	 0.3131***	 0.3421***	 0.3178***	 0.6152***	 0.8942***	 0.8121***	
	 (0.0720)	 (0.0723)	 (0.0896)	 (0.1111)	 (0.0087)	 (0.0113)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 21.3***	 25.6***	 19.9***	 5.1***	 	 	
Chi2	 	 	 	 	 134.3***	 139.8***	
R2	%	 6.4	 6.0	 2.4	 4.7	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 	 23.5	 15.7	
Obs	 975	 975	 967	 975	 975	 975	
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Table	4	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	effects	of	
instrumenting	for	the	GIM	index	
This	table	presents	average,	marginal	effects	for	the	causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	and	the	likelihood	
of	management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	is	described	in	Table	1.	Column	(1)	is	a	linear	
probability	regression	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	GIM	index	(non‐causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	
indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators).	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	
of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	linear	probability	regression	(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	GIM	
index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	and	the	other	variables.	The	instruments	for	the	
GIM	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	pseudo,	GIM	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	roll	forward	each	year	with	a	
lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(4)	does	the	same	as	Column	(1),	but	for	a	probit	regression.	Columns	(5)	and	(6)	do	the	same	as	Columns	(2)	and	(3),	respectively,	
but	for	an	IV,	probit	regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation).	Robust,	standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	***,	**,	*	
denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.         	
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Probit	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 0.0062	 	 0.0585***	 0.0065	 	 0.0554***	
	 (0.0046)	 	 (0.0192)	 (0.0045)	 	 (0.0179)	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.5958***	 	 	 0.5944***	 	
	 	 (0.0743)	 	 	 (0.0731)	 	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2778**	 	 	 0.2812***	 	
	 	 (0.1090)	 	 	 (0.1061)	 	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0961***	 0.0791	 ‐0.0939***	 ‐0.1052***	 0.0791	 ‐0.1004***	
	 (0.0308)	 (0.2061)	 (0.0323)	 (0.0359)	 (0.2046)	 (0.0360)	
All	cash	 0.0797***	 ‐0.0757	 0.0881***	 0.0803***	 ‐0.0755	 0.0847***	
	 (0.0258)	 (0.1613)	 (0.0272)	 (0.0256)	 (0.1602)	 (0.0255)	
ln[Size]	 0.0176	 0.3261***	 ‐0.0054	 0.0171*	 0.3264***	 0.0118	
	 (0.0109)	 (0.0650)	 (0.0136)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0645)	 (0.0116)	
Leverage	 0.0224	 0.7007	 ‐0.0362	 0.0334	 0.6997	 0.0125	
	 (0.0742)	 (0.4972)	 (0.0793)	 (0.0749)	 (0.4938)	 (0.0756)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0266*	 ‐0.0780	 ‐0.0160	 ‐0.0328	 ‐0.0777	 ‐0.0241	
	 (0.0136)	 (0.0901)	 (0.0147)	 (0.0213)	 (0.0894)	 (0.0195)	
Tangibility	 0.0510	 ‐0.1117	 0.0476	 0.0409	 ‐0.1119	 0.0308	
	 (0.0337)	 (0.2337)	 (0.0356)	 (0.0314)	 (0.2320)	 (0.0316)	
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Table	4	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	effects	of	
instrumenting	for	the	GIM	index 
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Probit	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0561	 ‐0.5020	 ‐0.0285	 ‐0.0661	 ‐0.5017	 ‐0.0694	
	 (0.0683)	 (0.4543)	 (0.0735)	 (0.0685)	 (0.4512)	 (0.0685)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0029*	 ‐0.0083	 ‐0.0017	 ‐0.1019**	 ‐0.0082	 ‐0.1072**	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0511)	 (0.0103)	 (0.0530)	
ROA	 ‐0.1462	 ‐1.4634**	 ‐0.1041	 ‐0.0838	 ‐1.4680**	 ‐0.1264	
	 (0.1086)	 (0.6825)	 (0.1140)	 (0.1118)	 (0.6773)	 (0.1109)	
Stock	return	 0.0059	 0.2404	 ‐0.0069	 0.0148	 0.2404	 0.0151	
	 (0.0304)	 (0.1971)	 (0.0323)	 (0.0319)	 (0.1958)	 (0.0323)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2028	 ‐1.4295	 ‐0.0815	 ‐0.2111	 ‐1.4295	 ‐0.1531	
	 (0.1613)	 (1.1285)	 (0.1745)	 (0.1795)	 (1.1206)	 (0.1793)	
Constant	 0.0669	 ‐0.4913	 ‐0.2843*	 0.1743***	 ‐0.5106	 0.1707***	
	 (0.0995)	 (1.2062)	 (0.1631)	 (0.0119)	 (1.1922)	 (0.0219)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 4.7***	 	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	 	 57.7***	 41.3***	 77.4***	
R2	%	 4.0	 	 	 	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%	 	 	 	 5.0	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 38.3***	 	 	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)		 	 7.8	 	 	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 0.1	 	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 8.6***	 	 8.5***	
Obs	 975	 954	 975	 954	
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Table	5	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	effects	of	censoring	firm	
years	absent	a	bid	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	Columns	(1)	
and	(2)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	
a	bid	on	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index),	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	
a	bid.	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	pseudo,	GIM	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	
roll	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(3)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(1)	and	(2),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	likelihood	of	
a	bid	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	GIM	index,	and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	but	with	the	addition	of	an	exclusion	restriction,	
California	 incorporation,	 which,	 with	 a	 lag	 of	 one	 year,	 is	 equal	 to	 one	 for	 a	 firm	 that	 is	 incorporated	 in	 California	 in	 the	 Center	 for	 Research	 in	 Security	
Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	IV,	linear	probability	regression	
(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	GIM	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	
the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	
that	is	generated	from	Column	(3).	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	rolling	ones	in	Column	(3).	The	other	variables	that	
are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	in	Column	(3).	Columns	(6)	and	(7)	do	the	same	as	Columns	(4)	and	(5),	respectively,	but	for	an	IV,	probit	regression	
(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation).	Standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(1),	(2),	
and	(3),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(4),	(5),	(6),	and	(7).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.											
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 ‐0.0081***	 	 	 0.0480**	 	 0.0465**	
	 	 (0.0024)	 	 	 (0.0209)	 	 (0.0195)	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.5706***	 	 ‐0.0033**	 0.5641***	 	 0.5651***	 	
	 (0.0527)	 	 (0.0014)	 (0.0753)	 	 (0.0740)	 	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.3198***	 	 ‐0.0044***	 0.2351**	 	 0.2320**	 	
	 (0.0607)	 	 (0.0016)	 (0.1110)	 	 (0.1096)	 	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 0.0616	 ‐0.0957***	 0.0615	 ‐0.1071***	
	 	 	 	 (0.2063)	 (0.0314)	 (0.2048)	 (0.0347)	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0758	 0.0875***	 ‐0.0759	 0.0848***	
	 	 	 	 (0.1608)	 (0.0266)	 (0.1596)	 (0.0252)	
ln[Size]	 0.1335***	 ‐0.0105***	 ‐0.0104***	 0.2336***	 ‐0.0157	 0.2332***	 ‐0.0061	
	 (0.0475)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0781)	 (0.0131)	 (0.0774)	 (0.0117)	
Leverage	 0.5312	 0.0189*	 0.0215**	 0.9522*	 0.0083	 0.9538*	 0.0635	
	 (0.3251)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0102)	 (0.5125)	 (0.0813)	 (0.5089)	 (0.0773)	
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Table	5	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	effects	of	censoring	firm	
years	absent	a	bid 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0832**	 ‐0.0079***	 ‐0.0080***	 ‐0.1229	 ‐0.0233	 ‐0.1233	 ‐0.0309	
	 (0.0341)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0924)	 (0.0154)	 (0.0916)	 (0.0195)	
Tangibility	 0.1808	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.0051	 ‐0.1473	 0.0408	 ‐0.1471	 0.0249	
	 (0.1633)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.2339)	 (0.0351)	 (0.2321)	 (0.0316)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.8410***	 ‐0.0297***	 ‐0.0328***	 ‐0.7617	 ‐0.0729	 ‐0.7627*	 ‐0.1203*	
	 (0.2951)	 (0.0092)	 (0.0089)	 (0.4642)	 (0.0757)	 (0.4609)	 (0.0713)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0323**	 0.0017	 0.0017	 ‐0.0002	 ‐0.0005	 ‐0.0003	 ‐0.0922*	
	 (0.0157)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0107)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0106)	 (0.0515)	
ROA	 0.0813	 ‐0.0178	 ‐0.0154	 ‐1.4058**	 ‐0.1157	 ‐1.4014**	 ‐0.1338	
	 (0.3770)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0153)	 (0.6797)	 (0.1110)	 (0.6748)	 (0.1070)	
Stock	return	 0.1882***	 ‐0.0034	 ‐0.0030	 0.1189	 ‐0.0228	 0.1185	 ‐0.0094	
	 (0.0451)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.2039)	 (0.0325)	 (0.2026)	 (0.0325)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐1.0931*	 ‐0.0562***	 ‐0.0588***	 ‐1.8970*	 ‐0.1676	 ‐1.8983*	 ‐0.2560	
	 (0.5868)	 (0.0200)	 (0.0192)	 (1.1406)	 (0.1736)	 (1.1327)	 (0.1829)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0396***	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.9662**	 0.1467*	 0.9688**	 0.1857**	
	 	 	 	 (0.4790)	 (0.0795)	 (0.4756)	 (0.0729)	
Constant	 0.3344	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐0.9989	 ‐0.3870**	 ‐0.9818	 0.1707***	
	 (0.7539)	 (0.0025)	 (0.0014)	 (1.2239)	 (0.1615)	 (1.2189)	 (0.0211)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Chi2	 355.5***	 365.2***	 66.2***	 77.1***	
Pseudo	R2	%	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 31.5***	 	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 6.4	 	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.0	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 15.4***	 	 4.8**	 5.0**	
Obs	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	
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Table	6	
Causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance:	effects	in	reduced	form	
This	table	presents	average,	marginal	effects	for	the	causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	
firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	and	the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance.	Main,	variable	
definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	
1.	Column	(1)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	of	Table	4,	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	
regressing	 the	 likelihood	of	management	 resistance	on	 the	 rolling	 instruments,	 only,	 for	 the	GIM	 index	
(indirect,	causal	relationship),	and	the	other	variables.	Column	(2)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	
of	Table	5,	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	
on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	GIM	index	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	other	variables,	and	
the	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	Column	(3)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(5)	
and	(6)	of	Table	4,	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	
the	 rolling	 instruments,	 only,	 for	 the	GIM	 index	 (indirect,	 causal	 relationship),	 and	 the	other	 variables.	
Column	(4)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(6)	and	(7)	of	Table	5,	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	GIM	index	(indirect,	causal	
relationship),	 the	 other	 variables,	 and	 the	 lambda	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 censoring	 firm	 years	 absent	 a	 bid.	
Standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	robust	in	Columns	(1)	
and	(3),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(2)	and	(4).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	
and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.										
	 Linear	prob.	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Variables	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0333***	 0.0269**	 0.0323***	 0.0269**	
	 (0.0116)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0110)	 (0.0113)	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0201	 0.0116	 0.0170	 0.0091	
	 (0.0135)	 (0.0139)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0135)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0892***	 ‐0.0927***	 ‐0.0996***	 ‐0.1068***	
	 (0.0310)	 (0.0305)	 (0.0360)	 (0.0346)	
All	cash	 0.0839***	 0.0839***	 0.0841***	 0.0842***	
	 (0.0259)	 (0.0257)	 (0.0255)	 (0.0252)	
ln[Size]	 0.0140	 ‐0.0045	 0.0132	 ‐0.0055	
	 (0.0108)	 (0.0120)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0113)	
Leverage	 0.0036	 0.0538	 0.0147	 0.0671	
	 (0.0734)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0747)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0202	 ‐0.0292**	 ‐0.0241	 ‐0.0314*	
	 (0.0131)	 (0.0138)	 (0.0192)	 (0.0190)	
Tangibility	 0.0408	 0.0337	 0.0304	 0.0247	
	 (0.0336)	 (0.0337)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0317)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0575	 ‐0.1093	 ‐0.0710	 ‐0.1229*	
	 (0.0686)	 (0.0701)	 (0.0680)	 (0.0693)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0021	 ‐0.0005	 ‐0.1065**	 ‐0.0920*	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0528)	 (0.0514)	
ROA	 ‐0.1950*	 ‐0.1835*	 ‐0.1360	 ‐0.1378	
	 (0.1130)	 (0.1109)	 (0.1139)	 (0.1097)	
Stock	return	 0.0072	 ‐0.0171	 0.0159	 ‐0.0091	
	 (0.0301)	 (0.0316)	 (0.0320)	 (0.0326)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.1651	 ‐0.2584	 ‐0.1550	 ‐0.2584	
	 (0.1621)	 (0.1603)	 (0.1770)	 (0.1786)	
Bid	lambda	 	 0.1928***	 	 0.1892***	
	 	 (0.0711)	 	 (0.0681)	
Constant	 ‐0.3353*	 ‐0.4366**	 0.1708***	 0.1708***	
	 (0.1745)	 (0.1773)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0118)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
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Table	6	(continued)	
Causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance:	effects	in	reduced	form 
	 Linear	prob.	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Variables	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	
F	 5.0***	 5.2***	 	 	
Chi2	 	 	 53.5***	 59.4***	
R2	%	 4.9	 5.6	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 6.1	 6.9	
Obs	 954	 954	 954	 954	
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Table	7	
Causal	relationship	between	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 (GIM	 index)	and	 the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance:	 fixed	
instruments	for	the	GIM	index		
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	Columns	(1)	
and	(2)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	
a	bid	on	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index),	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	
a	bid.	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	pseudo,	GIM	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	
are	fixed	each	year	from	an	original	lag	of	three	years,	instead	of	rolling	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(3)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(1)	
and	(2),	but	 in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	 the	 likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	 fixed	 instruments,	only,	 for	the	GIM	index,	and	the	other	variables	 that	are	not	
conditional	 on	 a	bid,	 but	with	 the	addition	of	 an	 exclusion	 restriction,	 California	 incorporation,	which,	with	 a	 lag	of	one	year,	 is	 equal	 to	one	 for	a	 firm	 that	 is	
incorporated	in	California	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	are	the	first	and	
second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	IV,	linear	probability	regression	(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	GIM	
index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	
and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(3).	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	
same	as	the	fixed	ones	in	Column	(3).	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	
in	Column	(3).	Column	(6)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(4)	and	(5),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	
the	fixed	instruments,	only,	for	the	GIM	index	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	other	variables,	and	the	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	
Columns	(7)	and	(8)	do	the	same	as	Columns	(4)	and	(5),	respectively,	but	for	an	IV,	probit	regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation).	Column	(9)	does	the	
same	as	Column	(6),	but	for	a	probit	regression.	Standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	
(1),	(2),	and	(3),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(4),	(5),	(6),	(7),	(8),	and	(9).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 ‐0.0073***	 	 	 0.0421**	 	 	 0.0402**	 	
	 	 (0.0022)	 	 	 (0.0190)	 	 	 (0.0180)	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 0.6740***	 	 ‐0.0040***	 0.6380***	 	 0.0248*	 0.6355***	 	 0.0241**	
	 (0.0590)	 	 (0.0015)	 (0.0831)	 	 (0.0128)	 (0.0827)	 	 (0.0122)	
HQ,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 0.3915***	 	 ‐0.0038**	 0.3151***	 	 0.0190	 0.3215***	 	 0.0170	
	 (0.0682)	 	 (0.0018)	 (0.1023)	 	 (0.0156)	 (0.0996)	 	 (0.0155)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 0.0777	 ‐0.0956***	 ‐0.0920***	 0.0781	 ‐0.1060***	 ‐0.1050***	
	 	 	 	 (0.2071)	 (0.0311)	 (0.0305)	 (0.2056)	 (0.0346)	 (0.0346)	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0857	 0.0871***	 0.0837***	 ‐0.0854	 0.0840***	 0.0836***	
	 	 	 	 (0.1601)	 (0.0264)	 (0.0257)	 (0.1589)	 (0.0252)	 (0.0252)	
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Table	7	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 (GIM	 index)	and	 the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance:	 fixed	
instruments	for	the	GIM	index 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
ln[Size]	 0.1033**	 ‐0.0104***	 ‐0.0102***	 0.2245***	 ‐0.0141	 ‐0.0041	 0.2252***	 ‐0.0060	 ‐0.0047	
	 (0.0480)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0768)	 (0.0129)	 (0.0120)	 (0.0762)	 (0.0117)	 (0.0113)	
Leverage	 0.5224	 0.0190*	 0.0213**	 0.9198*	 0.0141	 0.0501	 0.9166*	 0.0628	 0.0635	
	 (0.3239)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0102)	 (0.5090)	 (0.0802)	 (0.0746)	 (0.5054)	 (0.0773)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0711**	 ‐0.0079***	 ‐0.0080***	 ‐0.1138	 ‐0.0246	 ‐0.0290**	 ‐0.1134	 ‐0.0300	 ‐0.0297	
	 (0.0337)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0916)	 (0.0150)	 (0.0140)	 (0.0909)	 (0.0198)	 (0.0194)	
Tangibility	 0.1357	 ‐0.0050	 ‐0.0050	 ‐0.2111	 0.0410	 0.0321	 ‐0.2111	 0.0241	 0.0237	
	 (0.1631)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.2304)	 (0.0347)	 (0.0338)	 (0.2287)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0318)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.8501***	 ‐0.0295***	 ‐0.0324***	 ‐0.8393*	 ‐0.0782	 ‐0.1117	 ‐0.8373*	 ‐0.1226*	 ‐0.1234*	
	 (0.2921)	 (0.0091)	 (0.0089)	 (0.4637)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0699)	 (0.4602)	 (0.0712)	 (0.0693)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0225	 0.0016	 0.0016	 0.0056	 ‐0.0006	 ‐0.0003	 0.0057	 ‐0.0945*	 ‐0.0935*	
	 (0.0137)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0105)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0519)	 (0.0518)	
ROA	 0.0236	 ‐0.0175	 ‐0.0167	 ‐1.5325**	 ‐0.1198	 ‐0.1899*	 ‐1.5388**	 ‐0.1344	 ‐0.1449	
	 (0.3753)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0152)	 (0.6677)	 (0.1099)	 (0.1095)	 (0.6623)	 (0.1070)	 (0.1095)	
Stock	return	 0.1706***	 ‐0.0034	 ‐0.0030	 0.1618	 ‐0.0217	 ‐0.0144	 0.1624	 ‐0.0076	 ‐0.0069	
	 (0.0447)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.2043)	 (0.0321)	 (0.0316)	 (0.2029)	 (0.0325)	 (0.0325)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐1.1059*	 ‐0.0563***	 ‐0.0590***	 ‐1.8876*	 ‐0.1809	 ‐0.2598	 ‐1.8870*	 ‐0.2548	 ‐0.2582	
	 (0.5854)	 (0.0199)	 (0.0192)	 (1.1098)	 (0.1705)	 (0.1597)	 (1.1014)	 (0.1822)	 (0.1777)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0397***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.9528**	 0.1539*	 0.1909***	 0.9493**	 0.1875**	 0.1877***	
	 	 	 	 (0.4720)	 (0.0788)	 (0.0712)	 (0.4682)	 (0.0736)	 (0.0684)	
Constant	 ‐1.0611	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐2.2232*	 ‐0.3561**	 ‐0.4805***	 ‐2.2573**	 0.1708***	 0.1708***	
	 (0.8272)	 (0.0022)	 (0.0014)	 (1.1648)	 (0.1511)	 (0.1825)	 (1.1489)	 (0.0187)	 (0.0118)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 	 	 	 	 	 5.1***	 	 	 	
Chi2	 352.8***	 364.5***	 65.7***	 	 70.8***	 58.3***	
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Table	7	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 (GIM	 index)	and	 the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance:	 fixed	
instruments	for	the	GIM	index 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 5.6	 	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	 	 6.8	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 37.1***	 	 	 	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 7.3	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.2	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 15.7***	 	 4.3**	 	 4.1**	 	
Obs	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	 954	 954	
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Table	8	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	threshold‐
based	measure	for	the	GIM	index	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	The	additive	
measure	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	is	replaced	with	a	threshold‐based	measure,	GIM	dictatorship,	which	is	equal	to	one	for	a	firm	
that	has	a	GIM	index	in	excess	of	the	median,	GIM	index	for	all	firms	that	are	in	the	same	year	as	the	focus	firm,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Column	(1)	is	a	probit	regression	
for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	GIM	dictatorship	(non‐causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	
cash	bid,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	
respectively,	of	a	recursive,	bivariate	(bi‐)probit	regression	for	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	GIM	dictatorship,	and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	
The	 instruments	 for	GIM	dictatorship	 (exclusion	 restrictions)	 in	 the	 first	 stage,	 only,	 are	 the	pseudo,	GIM	 indices	 for	 same‐age	 (peer)	 firms	and	headquarters‐
proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	roll	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	a	recursive,	
bi‐probit	regression	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	GIM	dictatorship	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	
the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	
from	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	The	instruments	for	GIM	dictatorship	(exclusion	restrictions)	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	rolling	instruments	for	the	GIM	
index	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	
Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	Columns	(6)	and	(7)	do	the	same	as	Columns	(2)	and	(3),	respectively,	but	with	pseudo,	GIM	indices	for	peer	firms	and	HQ	firms	that	are	fixed	
each	year	from	an	original	lag	of	three	years.	Columns	(8)	and	(9)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	a	recursive,	bi‐probit	regression	for	the	likelihood	
of	management	resistance	on	GIM	dictatorship	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	
variables	 that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	 lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	 firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	 is	generated	 from	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	The	
instruments	for	GIM	dictatorship	(exclusion	restrictions)	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	fixed	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	The	
other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	Standard	errors	
are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	robust	in	Column	(1),	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(2),	(3),	(6),	and	(7),	and	bootstrapped	in	
Columns	(4),	(5),	(8),	and	(9).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 Probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Bid	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Resistance	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Bid	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Resistance	
GIM	dictatorship	 0.0383	 	 ‐0.0497***	 	 0.2601***	 	 ‐0.0447***	 	 0.2242**	
	 (0.0246)	 	 (0.0144)	 	 (0.0932)	 	 (0.0128)	 	 (0.0899)	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.0885***	 	 0.0944***	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.0090)	 	 (0.0135)	 	 	 	 	 	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.0515***	 	 0.0442**	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.0108)	 	 (0.0176)	 	 	 	 	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 	 	 	 	 	 0.1024***	 	 0.1005***	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.0099)	 	 (0.0150)	 	
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Table	8	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	threshold‐
based	measure	for	the	GIM	index 
	 Probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Bid	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Resistance	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Bid	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Resistance	
HQ,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 	 	 	 	 	 0.0586***	 	 0.0513***	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.0120)	 	 (0.0185)	 	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.1064***	 	 	 0.0212	 ‐0.1081***	 	 	 0.0223	 ‐0.1085***	
	 (0.0357)	 	 	 (0.0417)	 (0.0337)	 	 	 (0.0419)	 (0.0338)	
All	cash	 0.0795***	 	 	 0.0002	 0.0817***	 	 	 ‐0.0013	 0.0823***	
	 (0.0256)	 	 	 (0.0320)	 (0.0254)	 	 	 (0.0322)	 (0.0255)	
ln[Size]	 0.0174*	 0.0168**	 ‐0.0105***	 0.0380**	 ‐0.0147	 0.0122	 ‐0.0106***	 0.0365**	 ‐0.0134	
	 (0.0101)	 (0.0083)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0115)	 (0.0084)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0116)	
Leverage	 0.0336	 0.1046*	 0.0271**	 0.1227	 0.0350	 0.1044*	 0.0264**	 0.1159	 0.0408	
	 (0.0749)	 (0.0576)	 (0.0123)	 (0.0996)	 (0.0761)	 (0.0573)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0998)	 (0.0763)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0331	 ‐0.0115	 ‐0.0095***	 ‐0.0014	 ‐0.0307	 ‐0.0097	 ‐0.0092***	 ‐0.0005	 ‐0.0306	
	 (0.0213)	 (0.0076)	 (0.0021)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0188)	 (0.0075)	 (0.0021)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0192)	
Tangibility	 0.0387	 0.0362	 ‐0.0036	 0.0298	 0.0158	 0.0303	 ‐0.0039	 0.0231	 0.0185	
	 (0.0314)	 (0.0295)	 (0.0052)	 (0.0429)	 (0.0320)	 (0.0294)	 (0.0051)	 (0.0430)	 (0.0320)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0693	 ‐0.1517***	 ‐0.0427***	 ‐0.0453	 ‐0.1095	 ‐0.1536***	 ‐0.0411***	 ‐0.0595	 ‐0.1128	
	 (0.0685)	 (0.0558)	 (0.0112)	 (0.0930)	 (0.0691)	 (0.0554)	 (0.0107)	 (0.0937)	 (0.0693)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.1021**	 ‐0.0148	 0.0015	 ‐0.0080	 ‐0.0858*	 ‐0.0114	 0.0016	 ‐0.0068	 ‐0.0904*	
	 (0.0509)	 (0.0144)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0079)	 (0.0490)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0070)	 (0.0501)	
ROA	 ‐0.0850	 0.0244	 ‐0.0188	 ‐0.2029	 ‐0.0904	 0.0172	 ‐0.0190	 ‐0.2036	 ‐0.0918	
	 (0.1119)	 (0.0835)	 (0.0175)	 (0.1387)	 (0.1036)	 (0.0822)	 (0.0171)	 (0.1388)	 (0.1048)	
Stock	return	 0.0147	 0.0245***	 ‐0.0022	 0.0391	 ‐0.0182	 0.0218**	 ‐0.0025	 0.0461	 ‐0.0170	
	 (0.0320)	 (0.0088)	 (0.0039)	 (0.0396)	 (0.0321)	 (0.0087)	 (0.0038)	 (0.0394)	 (0.0322)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2185	 ‐0.1358	 ‐0.0714***	 0.0441	 ‐0.2582	 ‐0.1369	 ‐0.0698***	 0.0302	 ‐0.2647	
	 (0.1778)	 (0.1048)	 (0.0230)	 (0.2038)	 (0.1719)	 (0.1044)	 (0.0224)	 (0.2029)	 (0.1732)	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.0521	 0.1753***	 	 	 0.0491	 0.1832***	
	 	 	 	 (0.0891)	 (0.0669)	 	 	 (0.0895)	 (0.0673)	
Constant	 0.1743***	 0.4217***	 0.0564***	 0.4160***	 0.2106***	 0.4217***	 0.0546***	 0.4162***	 0.2009***	
	 (0.0119)	 (0.0109)	 (0.0056)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0288)	 (0.0108)	 (0.0047)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0259)	
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Table	8	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index)	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	threshold‐
based	measure	for	the	GIM	index 
	 Probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Bid	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Resistance	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Bid	
GIM	
dictatorship	 Resistance	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Chi2	 41.7***	 712.4***	 225.9***	 698.8***	 207.2***	
Pseudo	R2	%	 5.1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 15.6***	 6.0**	 15.6***	 4.9**	
Obs	 975	 20,717	 954	 20,717	 954	
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Table	9	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	The	Gompers,	
Ishii,	and	Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	is	replaced	with	a	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	(BCF)	index,	which	adds	
one	for	each	antitakeover	provision	that	a	 firm	has	out	of	a	subset	of	six	–	 including	staggered/classified	board,	supermajority	amendment,	and	poison	pill,	but	
excluding	fair	price	amendment	–	from	the	GIM	index.	Column	(1)	is	a	linear	probability	regression	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	BCF	index	
(non‐causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	
indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	regression	
(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	BCF	index,	and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	The	instruments	for	the	
BCF	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	pseudo,	BCF	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	are	constructed	for	the	subset	of	
six,	antitakeover	provisions	of	the	BCF	index	in	otherwise	the	same	way	as	those	for	the	GIM	index,	and	which	roll	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	
Column	(4)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(2)	and	(3),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	BCF	index,	
and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	but	with	the	addition	of	an	exclusion	restriction,	California	incorporation,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	
equal	to	one	for	a	firm	that	is	incorporated	in	California	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	
(5)	 and	 (6)	 are	 the	 first	 and	 second	 stages,	 respectively,	 of	 an	 IV,	 linear	 probability	 regression	 (using	 two‐stage	 least‐squares	 estimation)	 for	 the	 likelihood	of	
management	resistance	on	the	BCF	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	
that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(4).	The	instruments	for	the	BCF	
index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	rolling	ones	in	Column	(4).	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	
indicators	and	 industry	 indicators)	 in	Column	(4).	Column	(7)	does	 the	same	as	Columns	 (5)	and	 (6),	but	 in	 reduced	 form,	by	 linear	probability	 regressing	 the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	BCF	index	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	other	variables,	and	the	lambda	for	the	
effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	Standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	robust	in	Column	(1),	firm	clustered,	
robust	in	Columns	(2),	(3),	and	(4),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(5),	(6),	and	(7).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	
respectively.	
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 0.0102	 	 ‐0.0319**	 	 	 0.0101	 	
	 (0.0098)	 	 (0.0131)	 	 	 (0.0626)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2864***	 	 ‐0.0090**	 0.2880***	 	 0.0229	
	 	 (0.0705)	 	 (0.0041)	 (0.1060)	 	 (0.0328)	
HQ,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2957***	 	 ‐0.0083**	 0.3952***	 	 ‐0.0088	
	 	 (0.0621)	 	 (0.0034)	 (0.1065)	 	 (0.0310)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0976***	 	 	 	 0.1844*	 ‐0.0974***	 ‐0.0961***	
	 (0.0309)	 	 	 	 (0.1066)	 (0.0316)	 (0.0304)	
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Table	9	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index 
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 0.0789***	 	 	 	 0.0008	 0.0851***	 0.0836***	
	 (0.0259)	 	 	 	 (0.0834)	 (0.0257)	 (0.0260)	
ln[Size]	 0.0195*	 ‐0.0319	 ‐0.0110***	 ‐0.0108***	 0.0534	 ‐0.0038	 ‐0.0037	
	 (0.0107)	 (0.0232)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0393)	 (0.0118)	 (0.0121)	
Leverage	 0.0209	 0.3999**	 0.0201*	 0.0224**	 0.5829**	 0.0538	 0.0610	
	 (0.0744)	 (0.1639)	 (0.0114)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2621)	 (0.0859)	 (0.0742)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0261*	 ‐0.0757***	 ‐0.0076***	 ‐0.0079***	 ‐0.1102***	 ‐0.0307*	 ‐0.0320**	
	 (0.0137)	 (0.0179)	 (0.0022)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0420)	 (0.0178)	 (0.0143)	
Tangibility	 0.0517	 0.1130	 ‐0.0060	 ‐0.0057	 ‐0.0438	 0.0432	 0.0428	
	 (0.0337)	 (0.0833)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1225)	 (0.0337)	 (0.0339)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0565	 ‐0.5383***	 ‐0.0301***	 ‐0.0331***	 ‐0.2849	 ‐0.1124	 ‐0.1150	
	 (0.0684)	 (0.1543)	 (0.0115)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2344)	 (0.0738)	 (0.0705)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0030*	 0.0005	 0.0017	 0.0017	 ‐0.0056	 ‐0.0008	 ‐0.0011	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0068)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0059)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0018)	
ROA	 ‐0.1531	 0.0830	 ‐0.0162	 ‐0.0160	 ‐0.0580	 ‐0.1524	 ‐0.1465	
	 (0.1089)	 (0.2027)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0153)	 (0.3121)	 (0.1069)	 (0.1101)	
Stock	return	 0.0069	 0.1071***	 ‐0.0038	 ‐0.0033	 0.0256	 ‐0.0186	 ‐0.0187	
	 (0.0303)	 (0.0229)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0985)	 (0.0310)	 (0.0314)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2108	 ‐0.6635**	 ‐0.0564**	 ‐0.0598***	 ‐0.2828	 ‐0.2742*	 ‐0.2750*	
	 (0.1609)	 (0.2946)	 (0.0221)	 (0.0192)	 (0.6584)	 (0.1624)	 (0.1606)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 0.0415***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.0123)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 0.0858	 0.2078***	 0.2068***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.2418)	 (0.0727)	 (0.0713)	
Constant	 0.0867	 1.3130***	 0.0461***	 0.0461***	 0.4586	 ‐0.1560	 ‐0.1613	
	 (0.0953)	 (0.2774)	 (0.0079)	 (0.0015)	 (0.4624)	 (0.1647)	 (0.1507)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 4.6***	 	 	 	 	 	 4.4***	
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Table	9	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index 
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 	 411.4***	 363.7***	 60.5***	 	
R2	%	 3.9	 	 	 	 	 	 4.7	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 10.7***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 2.4	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 0.5	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 12.8***	 	 0.0	 	
Obs	 975	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	
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Table	10	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	
Wehrly	(2017)	index	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	The	Gompers,	
Ishii,	and	Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	is	replaced	with	a	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	(KSW)	index,	which	
is	the	GIM	index	minus	a	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	(BCF)	index	that	adds	one	for	each	antitakeover	provision	that	a	firm	has	out	of	a	subset	of	six	–	including	
staggered/classified	board,	supermajority	amendment,	and	poison	pill,	but	excluding	fair	price	amendment	–	from	the	GIM	index.	Column	(1)	is	a	linear	probability	
regression	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	KSW	index	(non‐causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	
for	an	all,	cash	bid,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	the	first	and	
second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	KSW	index,	
and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	The	instruments	for	the	KSW	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	pseudo,	KSW	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	
and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	are	those	for	the	GIM	index	minus	those	constructed	for	the	subset	of	six,	antitakeover	provisions	of	the	BCF	index	in	
otherwise	the	same	way	as	those	for	the	GIM	index,	and	which	roll	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(4)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(2)	and	
(3),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	KSW	index,	and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	
on	a	bid,	but	with	the	addition	of	an	exclusion	restriction,	California	incorporation,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	equal	to	one	for	a	firm	that	is	incorporated	in	
California	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(5)	and	(6)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	
respectively,	of	an	IV,	linear	probability	regression	(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	KSW	index	(direct,	
causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	
for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(4).	The	instruments	for	the	KSW	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	
rolling	ones	in	Column	(4).	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	
(4).	Column	(7)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(5)	and	(6),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	rolling	
instruments,	only,	for	the	KSW	index	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	other	variables,	and	the	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	Standard	
errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	robust	in	Column	(1),	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(2),	(3),	and	(4),	and	bootstrapped	
in	Columns	(5),	(6),	and	(7).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
KSW	index	 0.0071	 	 ‐0.0092***	 	 	 0.0717***	 	
	 (0.0064)	 	 (0.0029)	 	 	 (0.0260)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 0.5948***	 	 ‐0.0041**	 0.6090***	 	 0.0412***	
	 	 (0.0492)	 	 (0.0018)	 (0.0705)	 	 (0.0158)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 0.3528***	 	 ‐0.0051**	 0.2079**	 	 0.0228	
	 	 (0.0584)	 	 (0.0023)	 (0.0980)	 	 (0.0185)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0950***	 	 	 	 ‐0.1122	 ‐0.0855***	 ‐0.0939***	
	 (0.0309)	 	 	 	 (0.1511)	 (0.0319)	 (0.0305)	
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Table	10	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	
Wehrly	(2017)	index 
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 0.0802***	 	 	 	 ‐0.0566	 0.0917***	 0.0882***	
	 (0.0258)	 	 	 	 (0.1150)	 (0.0268)	 (0.0256)	
ln[Size]	 0.0177	 0.1685***	 ‐0.0103***	 ‐0.0103***	 0.1848***	 ‐0.0194	 ‐0.0054	
	 (0.0109)	 (0.0335)	 (0.0013)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0555)	 (0.0135)	 (0.0120)	
Leverage	 0.0259	 0.1226	 0.0190*	 0.0211**	 0.3501	 0.0321	 0.0550	
	 (0.0739)	 (0.2245)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0102)	 (0.3668)	 (0.0790)	 (0.0743)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0274**	 ‐0.0134	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0100	 ‐0.0294**	 ‐0.0296**	
	 (0.0136)	 (0.0241)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0654)	 (0.0147)	 (0.0137)	
Tangibility	 0.0511	 0.0785	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.1077	 0.0381	 0.0301	
	 (0.0338)	 (0.1111)	 (0.0044)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1595)	 (0.0357)	 (0.0338)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0577	 ‐0.2940	 ‐0.0302***	 ‐0.0325***	 ‐0.4689	 ‐0.0768	 ‐0.1089	
	 (0.0682)	 (0.2108)	 (0.0090)	 (0.0089)	 (0.3343)	 (0.0752)	 (0.0699)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0030*	 ‐0.0331**	 0.0017	 0.0017	 0.0077	 ‐0.0008	 ‐0.0001	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0141)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0076)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 ‐0.1442	 0.0162	 ‐0.0195	 ‐0.0178	 ‐1.4199***	 ‐0.0859	 ‐0.1945*	
	 (0.1091)	 (0.2613)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0153)	 (0.4906)	 (0.1159)	 (0.1103)	
Stock	return	 0.0062	 0.0843***	 ‐0.0033	 ‐0.0031	 0.1039	 ‐0.0241	 ‐0.0160	
	 (0.0304)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.1449)	 (0.0331)	 (0.0317)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2029	 ‐0.4349	 ‐0.0574***	 ‐0.0589***	 ‐1.6138**	 ‐0.1433	 ‐0.2570	
	 (0.1614)	 (0.4151)	 (0.0199)	 (0.0193)	 (0.7066)	 (0.1704)	 (0.1604)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 0.0413***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.0122)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 0.8571**	 0.1361*	 0.1936***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.3324)	 (0.0780)	 (0.0702)	
Constant	 0.0757	 ‐0.7089	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐1.3028	 ‐0.3850**	 ‐0.5123***	
	 (0.1004)	 (0.5212)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0015)	 (0.8439)	 (0.1511)	 (0.1742)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 4.5***	 	 	 	 	 	 5.4***	
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Table	10	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	
Wehrly	(2017)	index 
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 	 346.3***	 361.8***	 64.6***	 	
R2	%	 3.9	 	 	 	 	 	 6.0	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 42.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 8.2	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 0.2	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 10.8***	 	 8.0***	 	
Obs	 975	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	
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Table	11	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	and	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	index	jointly	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	The	Gompers,	
Ishii,	and	Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	is	jointly	replaced	with	a	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	(BCF)	index,	
which	adds	one	for	each	antitakeover	provision	that	a	firm	has	out	of	a	subset	of	six	–	including	staggered/classified	board,	supermajority	amendment,	and	poison	
pill,	but	excluding	fair	price	amendment	–	from	the	GIM	index,	and	a	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	(KSW)	index,	which	is	the	GIM	index	minus	the	BCF	index.	
Column	(1)	is	a	linear	probability	regression	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	BCF	index	(non‐causal	relationship),	the	KSW	index	(non‐causal	
relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	
that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	the	joint,	first	stages,	and	Column	(4)	is	the	second	stage,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	regression	
(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	BCF	index,	the	KSW	index,	and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	The	
instruments	for	the	BCF	index	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	are	pseudo,	BCF	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	are	
constructed	for	the	subset	of	six,	antitakeover	provisions	of	the	BCF	index	in	otherwise	the	same	way	as	those	for	the	GIM	index,	and	which	roll	forward	each	year	
with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	The	instruments	for	the	KSW	index	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	are	pseudo,	KSW	indices	for	peer	firms	and	HQ	firms,	which	are	
those	for	the	GIM	index	minus	those	for	the	BCF	index,	and	which	also	roll	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(5)	does	the	same	as	Columns	
(2),	(3),	and	(4),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	BCF	index	and	KSW	index,	and	the	other	
variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	but	with	the	addition	of	an	exclusion	restriction,	California	incorporation,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	equal	to	one	for	
a	firm	that	is	incorporated	in	California	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(6)	and	(7)	are	the	
joint,	 first	 stages,	 and	 Column	 (8)	 is	 the	 second	 stage,	 of	 an	 IV,	 linear	 probability	 regression	 (using	 two‐stage	 least‐squares	 estimation)	 for	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance	on	the	BCF	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	KSW	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	
the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	
from	Column	(5).	The	instruments	for	the	BCF	index	and	KSW	index	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	rolling	ones	in	Column	(5).	The	other	variables	
that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(5).	Column	(9)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(6),	
(7),	and	(8),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	BCF	index	and	
KSW	index	(indirect,	causal	relationships),	the	other	variables,	and	the	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	Standard	errors	are	shown	in	
brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	robust	in	Column	(1),	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(2),	(3),	(4),	and	(5),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(6),	
(7),	(8),	and	(9).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 0.0077	 	 	 ‐0.0222	 	 	 	 ‐0.0361	 	
	 (0.0105)	 	 	 (0.0151)	 	 	 	 (0.0712)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.1161	 0.0966	 	 ‐0.0054	 0.1639	 0.0558	 	 ‐0.0319	
	 	 (0.0860)	 (0.1274)	 	 (0.0052)	 (0.1238)	 (0.1835)	 	 (0.0390)	
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Table	11	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	and	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	index	jointly	
	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
HQ,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2912***	 ‐0.0785	 	 ‐0.0058	 0.3929***	 ‐0.2458	 	 ‐0.0263	
	 	 (0.0669)	 (0.1011)	 	 (0.0037)	 (0.1068)	 (0.1624)	 	 (0.0330)	
KSW	index	 0.0053	 	 	 ‐0.0035	 	 	 	 0.0796***	 	
	 (0.0070)	 	 	 (0.0043)	 	 	 	 (0.0291)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 0.1307***	 0.5697***	 	 ‐0.0026	 0.1047*	 0.5931***	 	 0.0496***	
	 	 (0.0409)	 (0.0596)	 	 (0.0023)	 (0.0585)	 (0.0857)	 	 (0.0190)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 ‐0.0061	 0.3742***	 	 ‐0.0037	 ‐0.0025	 0.2650**	 	 0.0271	
	 	 (0.0454)	 (0.0630)	 	 (0.0025)	 (0.0741)	 (0.1027)	 	 (0.0199)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0964***	 	 	 	 	 0.1886*	 ‐0.1338	 ‐0.0790**	 ‐0.0962***	
	 (0.0311)	 	 	 	 	 (0.1066)	 (0.1505)	 (0.0347)	 (0.0305)	
All	cash	 0.0796***	 	 	 	 	 0.0163	 ‐0.0483	 0.0942***	 0.0931***	
	 (0.0260)	 	 	 	 	 (0.0842)	 (0.1174)	 (0.0272)	 (0.0258)	
ln[Size]	 0.0179*	 ‐0.0476**	 0.1685***	 ‐0.0103***	 ‐0.0105***	 0.0453	 0.1834***	 ‐0.0191	 ‐0.0057	
	 (0.0108)	 (0.0242)	 (0.0336)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0397)	 (0.0553)	 (0.0137)	 (0.0121)	
Leverage	 0.0216	 0.4331***	 0.1275	 0.0184	 0.0217**	 0.5911**	 0.3740	 0.0520	 0.0583	
	 (0.0744)	 (0.1633)	 (0.2244)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2610)	 (0.3691)	 (0.0916)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0264*	 ‐0.0712***	 ‐0.0147	 ‐0.0077***	 ‐0.0081***	 ‐0.1112***	 ‐0.0194	 ‐0.0340*	 ‐0.0313**	
	 (0.0137)	 (0.0178)	 (0.0240)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0419)	 (0.0658)	 (0.0184)	 (0.0142)	
Tangibility	 0.0511	 0.0979	 0.0800	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.0052	 ‐0.0661	 ‐0.1011	 0.0370	 0.0299	
	 (0.0337)	 (0.0834)	 (0.1111)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1224)	 (0.1599)	 (0.0364)	 (0.0340)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0559	 ‐0.5500***	 ‐0.3003	 ‐0.0293**	 ‐0.0329***	 ‐0.2865	 ‐0.4740	 ‐0.0836	 ‐0.1098	
	 (0.0684)	 (0.1544)	 (0.2117)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2351)	 (0.3378)	 (0.0783)	 (0.0701)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0029*	 0.0034	 ‐0.0336**	 0.0016	 0.0017	 ‐0.0037	 0.0063	 ‐0.0010	 0.0000	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0066)	 (0.0140)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0058)	 (0.0079)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 ‐0.1474	 0.0954	 0.0392	 ‐0.0176	 ‐0.0150	 ‐0.1013	 ‐1.3371***	 ‐0.0726	 ‐0.1875*	
	 (0.1094)	 (0.2045)	 (0.2634)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0153)	 (0.3175)	 (0.4928)	 (0.1235)	 (0.1131)	
Stock	return	 0.0060	 0.1028***	 0.0856***	 ‐0.0035	 ‐0.0030	 0.0291	 0.1053	 ‐0.0232	 ‐0.0144	
	 (0.0304)	 (0.0229)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0036)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0983)	 (0.1447)	 (0.0334)	 (0.0317)	
‐26‐	
 
Table	11	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	and	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	index	jointly 
	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2038	 ‐0.7040**	 ‐0.4312	 ‐0.0553**	 ‐0.0589***	 ‐0.2765	 ‐1.6202**	 ‐0.1412	 ‐0.2595	
	 (0.1617)	 (0.2955)	 (0.4139)	 (0.0227)	 (0.0192)	 (0.6528)	 (0.7109)	 (0.1693)	 (0.1616)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 	 0.0395***	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 	 0.0954	 0.8636***	 0.1318*	 0.1948***	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.2427)	 (0.3343)	 (0.0771)	 (0.0712)	
Constant	 0.0678	 0.9439**	 ‐0.7263	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 0.1138	 ‐1.1456	 ‐0.3420**	 ‐0.4636***	
	 (0.1001)	 (0.3813)	 (0.5297)	 (0.0069)	 (0.0014)	 (0.6172)	 (0.8556)	 (0.1694)	 (0.1790)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 4.3***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.7***	
Chi2	 	 380.1***	 365.9***	 63.1***	 	
R2	%	 4.0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6.1	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 	 6.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 	 2.7	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 	 22.0***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)		 	 	 	 	 	 8.5	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 	 0.8	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 14.4***	 	 8.8**	 	
Obs	 975	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	
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Table	12	
Causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance				
This	table	presents	average,	marginal	effects	for	the	causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	
resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	 the	end	of	 the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	 is	described	 in	Table	1.	Column	(1)	 is	a	 linear	
regression	for	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	on	the	instruments,	only,	for	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index),	the	
indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	
firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(3)	of	Table	5,	and	an	exclusion	restriction,	which	is	the	pseudo,	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	
pre‐bid	price	to	high	price.	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	are	the	pseudo,	GIM	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	and	are	
the	same	as	the	ones	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5,	which	roll	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	
the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	
an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	linear	probability	regression	(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	GIM	index	
(direct,	causal	relationship),	a	residual	(abnormal	part),	only,	for	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	(non‐causal	relationship)	that	is	generated	from	
Column	(1),	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	
generated	from	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	rolling	ones	in	Column	(1),	and	the	rolling	ones	
in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	
(1),	and	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	do	the	same	as	Columns	(2)	and	(3),	respectively,	but	
with	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	(non‐causal	relationship)	being	jointly	included	with	the	residual.	Columns	(1)	and	(6)	are	the	joint,	first	stages,	
and	Column	(7)	is	the	second	stage,	of	an	IV,	linear	probability	regression	(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	
the	GIM	 index	(direct,	causal	 relationship),	 the	actual	premium	offered	by	 the	 initial	bidder	(direct,	causal	relationship),	 the	 indicator	 for	an	all,	 cash	bid,	other	
variables	 that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	 lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	 firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	 is	generated	 from	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	The	
instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	rolling	ones	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5,	and	the	instrument	for	the	actual	premium	
offered	by	the	initial	bidder	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	is	the	pseudo	one,	pre‐bid	price	to	high	price.	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	
same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	5.	Column	(8)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(6)	and	(7),	but	in	reduced	form,	
by	 linear	probability	 regressing	 the	 likelihood	of	management	 resistance	on	 the	 rolling	 instruments,	 only,	 for	 the	GIM	 index	 (indirect,	 causal	 relationship),	 the	
instrument,	only,	for	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	other	variables,	and	the	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	
firm	years	absent	a	bid.	Bootstrapped,	standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	
and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.						
	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 	 0.0504**	 	 0.0535**	 	 0.0535**	 	
	 	 	 (0.0209)	 	 (0.0218)	 	 (0.0223)	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0029	 0.5633***	 	 0.5521***	 	 0.5495***	 	 0.0293**	
	 (0.0105)	 (0.0750)	 	 (0.0756)	 	 (0.0758)	 	 (0.0120)	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0035	 0.2345**	 	 0.2248**	 	 0.2217**	 	 0.0137	
	 (0.0124)	 (0.1108)	 	 (0.1109)	 	 (0.1113)	 	 (0.0142)	
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Table	12	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance 
	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 ‐0.8811	 0.1205	 	 0.1205	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.6469)	 (0.1136)	 	 (0.1165)	 	
Pre‐bid	price	to	high	price	 ‐0.6758***	 	 	 	 	 0.5954	 	 ‐0.0499	
	 (0.0837)	 	 	 	 	 (0.4373)	 	 (0.0713)	
Abnormal,	initial	premium	 	 0.1652	 ‐0.1194***	 1.0463	 ‐0.2404*	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.2181)	 (0.0345)	 (0.6824)	 (0.1230)	 	 	 	
All	cash	 ‐0.0177	 ‐0.0777	 0.0907***	 ‐0.1052	 0.0946***	 ‐0.0896	 0.0946***	 0.0878***	
	 (0.0242)	 (0.1605)	 (0.0266)	 (0.1625)	 (0.0274)	 (0.1610)	 (0.0281)	 (0.0260)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0113	 0.2319***	 ‐0.0136	 0.2066**	 ‐0.0110	 0.2165***	 ‐0.0110	 ‐0.0005	
	 (0.0125)	 (0.0777)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0817)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0794)	 (0.0136)	 (0.0122)	
Leverage	 0.1323*	 0.9616*	 ‐0.0086	 1.0974**	 ‐0.0298	 0.9808*	 ‐0.0298	 0.0379	
	 (0.0699)	 (0.5096)	 (0.0814)	 (0.5153)	 (0.0832)	 (0.5086)	 (0.0862)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0189	 ‐0.1240	 ‐0.0214	 ‐0.1397	 ‐0.0189	 ‐0.1230	 ‐0.0189	 ‐0.0276**	
	 (0.0143)	 (0.0925)	 (0.0154)	 (0.0928)	 (0.0157)	 (0.0912)	 (0.0153)	 (0.0135)	
Tangibility	 ‐0.0977***	 ‐0.1533	 0.0505	 ‐0.2391	 0.0627*	 ‐0.1530	 0.0627*	 0.0427	
	 (0.0344)	 (0.2313)	 (0.0349)	 (0.2400)	 (0.0372)	 (0.2321)	 (0.0375)	 (0.0332)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0811	 ‐0.7673*	 ‐0.0625	 ‐0.8470*	 ‐0.0494	 ‐0.7755*	 ‐0.0494	 ‐0.1002	
	 (0.0904)	 (0.4636)	 (0.0759)	 (0.4667)	 (0.0778)	 (0.4615)	 (0.0796)	 (0.0703)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0127***	 ‐0.0008	 0.0004	 ‐0.0091	 0.0015	 0.0021	 0.0015	 0.0001	
	 (0.0018)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0118)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0108)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 0.2391	 ‐1.4020**	 ‐0.1175	 ‐1.3478**	 ‐0.1197	 ‐1.5585**	 ‐0.1197	 ‐0.1761	
	 (0.1723)	 (0.6806)	 (0.1114)	 (0.6818)	 (0.1108)	 (0.6919)	 (0.1082)	 (0.1093)	
Stock	return	 0.0148	 0.1111	 ‐0.0110	 ‐0.0010	 0.0039	 ‐0.0140	 0.0039	 0.0052	
	 (0.0501)	 (0.2015)	 (0.0322)	 (0.2105)	 (0.0342)	 (0.2134)	 (0.0359)	 (0.0341)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.0050	 ‐1.9031*	 ‐0.1536	 ‐1.9908*	 ‐0.1360	 ‐1.9864*	 ‐0.1360	 ‐0.2422	
	 (0.1461)	 (1.1384)	 (0.1743)	 (1.1451)	 (0.1773)	 (1.1487)	 (0.1801)	 (0.1599)	
Bid	lambda	 ‐0.0360	 0.9712**	 0.1369*	 1.0433**	 0.1246	 1.0750**	 0.1246	 0.1765**	
	 (0.0825)	 (0.4778)	 (0.0801)	 (0.4838)	 (0.0816)	 (0.4880)	 (0.0817)	 (0.0708)	
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Table	12	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance 
	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Constant	 0.4121**	 ‐0.9533	 ‐0.4530***	 ‐0.3000	 ‐0.5361***	 ‐0.6631	 ‐0.5361***	 ‐0.5297***	
	 (0.1768)	 (1.2082)	 (0.1581)	 (1.3437)	 (0.1884)	 (1.2434)	 (0.1928)	 (0.1803)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 8.8***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.4***	
Chi2	 	 66.0***	 65.8***	 53.2***	 	
R2	%	 14.0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.9	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 31.7***	 29.6***	 22.1***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 6.4	 6.0	 6.5	 	
F	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)	 	 	 	 	 	 21.9***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)	 	 	 	 	 	 10.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 5.3**	 5.6**	 7.3**	 	
Obs	 954	 954	 954	 954	 954	
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Appendix	
Table	A1	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	with	fixed	instruments	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	The	Gompers,	
Ishii,	and	Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	is	replaced	with	a	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	(BCF)	index,	which	adds	
one	for	each	antitakeover	provision	that	a	 firm	has	out	of	a	subset	of	six	–	 including	staggered/classified	board,	supermajority	amendment,	and	poison	pill,	but	
excluding	fair	price	amendment	–	from	the	GIM	index.	Columns	(1)	and	(2)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	
regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	BCF	index,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	
that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	The	instruments	for	the	BCF	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	pseudo,	BCF	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐
proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	are	constructed	for	the	subset	of	six,	antitakeover	provisions	of	the	BCF	index	in	otherwise	the	same	way	as	those	for	the	GIM	index,	and	
which	are	fixed	each	year	from	an	original	lag	of	three	years,	instead	of	rolling	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(3)	does	the	same	as	
Columns	(1)	and	(2),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	fixed	instruments,	only,	for	the	BCF	index,	and	the	other	variables	that	
are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	but	with	the	addition	of	an	exclusion	restriction,	California	incorporation,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	equal	to	one	for	a	firm	that	is	
incorporated	in	California	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	are	the	first	and	
second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	IV,	linear	probability	regression	(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	BCF	
index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	
and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(3).	The	instruments	for	the	BCF	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	
same	as	the	fixed	ones	in	Column	(3).	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	
in	Column	(3).	Column	(6)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(4)	and	(5),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	
the	fixed	instruments,	only,	for	the	BCF	index	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	other	variables,	and	the	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	
Standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(1),	(2),	and	(3),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	
(4),	(5),	and	(6).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 	 ‐0.0326**	 	 	 ‐0.0034	 	
	 	 (0.0133)	 	 	 (0.0536)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.3706***	 	 ‐0.0137***	 0.4577***	 	 0.0105	
	 (0.0912)	 	 (0.0049)	 (0.1283)	 	 (0.0397)	
HQ,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.3481***	 	 ‐0.0080*	 0.4935***	 	 ‐0.0106	
	 (0.0747)	 	 (0.0042)	 (0.1150)	 	 (0.0360)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 0.1988*	 ‐0.0955***	 ‐0.0968***	
	 	 	 	 (0.1071)	 (0.0314)	 (0.0304)	
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Table	A1	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	with	fixed	instruments 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0245	 0.0852***	 0.0846***	
	 	 	 	 (0.0835)	 (0.0257)	 (0.0261)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0368	 ‐0.0108***	 ‐0.0106***	 0.0510	 ‐0.0028	 ‐0.0031	
	 (0.0234)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0389)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0120)	
Leverage	 0.3995**	 0.0202*	 0.0222**	 0.5238**	 0.0600	 0.0587	
	 (0.1637)	 (0.0114)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2600)	 (0.0835)	 (0.0746)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0740***	 ‐0.0077***	 ‐0.0080***	 ‐0.1059**	 ‐0.0327**	 ‐0.0322**	
	 (0.0178)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0426)	 (0.0166)	 (0.0144)	
Tangibility	 0.1032	 ‐0.0056	 ‐0.0054	 ‐0.0501	 0.0433	 0.0434	
	 (0.0837)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1216)	 (0.0339)	 (0.0339)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.5378***	 ‐0.0301***	 ‐0.0329***	 ‐0.2930	 ‐0.1168	 ‐0.1162*	
	 (0.1539)	 (0.0116)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2325)	 (0.0732)	 (0.0704)	
Sales	growth	 0.0025	 0.0016	 0.0017	 ‐0.0035	 ‐0.0009	 ‐0.0010	
	 (0.0068)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0056)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0018)	
ROA	 0.0768	 ‐0.0156	 ‐0.0160	 ‐0.0680	 ‐0.1506	 ‐0.1489	
	 (0.2025)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0152)	 (0.3076)	 (0.1070)	 (0.1087)	
Stock	return	 0.1054***	 ‐0.0037	 ‐0.0032	 0.0347	 ‐0.0173	 ‐0.0173	
	 (0.0229)	 (0.0036)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0991)	 (0.0310)	 (0.0314)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.6835**	 ‐0.0557**	 ‐0.0592***	 ‐0.2393	 ‐0.2760*	 ‐0.2741*	
	 (0.2931)	 (0.0221)	 (0.0192)	 (0.6498)	 (0.1613)	 (0.1607)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0409***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0122)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.0600	 0.2080***	 0.2066***	
	 	 	 	 (0.2375)	 (0.0722)	 (0.0716)	
Constant	 1.0449***	 0.0461***	 0.0461***	 ‐0.0678	 ‐0.1282	 ‐0.1315	
	 (0.3125)	 (0.0080)	 (0.0015)	 (0.4819)	 (0.1495)	 (0.1531)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 	 	 	 	 	 4.2***	
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Table	A1	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	with	fixed	instruments 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 418.5***	 367.0***	 59.2***	 	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 4.6	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 16.3***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)		 	 	 	 3.4	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.1	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 13.1***	 	 0.1	 	
Obs	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	
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Table	A2	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	
Wehrly	(2017)	index	with	fixed	instruments	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	The	Gompers,	
Ishii,	and	Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	is	replaced	with	a	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	(KSW)	index,	which	
is	the	GIM	index	minus	a	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	(BCF)	index	that	adds	one	for	each	antitakeover	provision	that	a	firm	has	out	of	a	subset	of	six	–	including	
staggered/classified	board,	supermajority	amendment,	and	poison	pill,	but	excluding	fair	price	amendment	–	from	the	GIM	index.	Columns	(1)	and	(2)	are	the	first	
and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	KSW	
index,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid.	The	instruments	for	the	KSW	index	in	the	first	stage,	
only,	are	pseudo,	KSW	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	are	those	for	the	GIM	index	minus	those	constructed	for	the	
subset	of	six,	antitakeover	provisions	of	the	BCF	index	in	otherwise	the	same	way	as	those	for	the	GIM	index,	and	which	are	fixed	each	year	from	an	original	lag	of	
three	years,	instead	of	rolling	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(3)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(1)	and	(2),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	
regressing	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	fixed	instruments,	only,	for	the	KSW	index,	and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	but	with	the	addition	of	
an	exclusion	restriction,	California	incorporation,	which,	with	a	lag	of	one	year,	is	equal	to	one	for	a	firm	that	is	incorporated	in	California	in	the	Center	for	Research	
in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	are	the	first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	IV,	linear	probability	
regression	(using	two‐stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	KSW	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	
offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	
absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(3).	The	instruments	for	the	KSW	index	in	the	first	stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	fixed	ones	in	Column	(3).	The	other	
variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3).	Column	(6)	does	the	same	as	
Columns	(4)	and	(5),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	fixed	instruments,	only,	for	the	KSW	index	
(indirect,	 causal	 relationship),	 the	 other	 variables,	 and	 the	 lambda	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 censoring	 firm	 years	 absent	 a	 bid.	 Standard	 errors	 are	 shown	 in	 brackets	
underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(1),	(2),	and	(3),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(4),	(5),	and	(6).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	
significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
KSW	index	 	 ‐0.0082***	 	 	 0.0666***	 	
	 	 (0.0026)	 	 	 (0.0243)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 0.6943***	 	 ‐0.0047**	 0.6771***	 	 0.0393**	
	 (0.0521)	 	 (0.0020)	 (0.0756)	 	 (0.0167)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 0.4203***	 	 ‐0.0043*	 0.2571***	 	 0.0350*	
	 (0.0650)	 	 (0.0024)	 (0.0971)	 	 (0.0201)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 ‐0.1059	 ‐0.0861***	 ‐0.0937***	
	 	 	 	 (0.1510)	 (0.0316)	 (0.0305)	
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Table	A2	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	
Wehrly	(2017)	index	with	fixed	instruments	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0575	 0.0912***	 0.0886***	
	 	 	 	 (0.1142)	 (0.0267)	 (0.0256)	
ln[Size]	 0.1440***	 ‐0.0102***	 ‐0.0102***	 0.1751***	 ‐0.0182	 ‐0.0052	
	 (0.0336)	 (0.0013)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0548)	 (0.0133)	 (0.0120)	
Leverage	 0.1176	 0.0191*	 0.0210**	 0.3884	 0.0344	 0.0550	
	 (0.2224)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0102)	 (0.3668)	 (0.0784)	 (0.0743)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0044	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0062	 ‐0.0298**	 ‐0.0295**	
	 (0.0237)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0643)	 (0.0145)	 (0.0139)	
Tangibility	 0.0470	 ‐0.0052	 ‐0.0052	 ‐0.1637	 0.0383	 0.0273	
	 (0.1109)	 (0.0044)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1577)	 (0.0355)	 (0.0340)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.3118	 ‐0.0301***	 ‐0.0322***	 ‐0.5354	 ‐0.0797	 ‐0.1115	
	 (0.2091)	 (0.0089)	 (0.0089)	 (0.3367)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0697)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0265**	 0.0016	 0.0017	 0.0092	 ‐0.0008	 0.0000	
	 (0.0121)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0075)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 ‐0.0118	 ‐0.0194	 ‐0.0186	 ‐1.4680***	 ‐0.0902	 ‐0.2006*	
	 (0.2588)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0152)	 (0.4835)	 (0.1147)	 (0.1094)	
Stock	return	 0.0695**	 ‐0.0033	 ‐0.0031	 0.1283	 ‐0.0233	 ‐0.0135	
	 (0.0313)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.1445)	 (0.0328)	 (0.0318)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.4113	 ‐0.0579***	 ‐0.0593***	 ‐1.6279**	 ‐0.1537	 ‐0.2622	
	 (0.4155)	 (0.0199)	 (0.0193)	 (0.6877)	 (0.1691)	 (0.1601)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0415***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0122)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.8618***	 0.1413*	 0.1930***	
	 	 	 	 (0.3319)	 (0.0778)	 (0.0702)	
Constant	 ‐1.7008***	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐1.9854**	 ‐0.3675**	 ‐0.5783***	
	 (0.5643)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0014)	 (0.8452)	 (0.1453)	 (0.1783)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 	 	 	 	 	 5.4***	
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Table	A2	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	
Wehrly	(2017)	index	with	fixed	instruments 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 343.7***	 361.0***	 64.5***	 	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 6.0	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 47.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)		 	 	 	 9.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.8	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 10.4***	 	 7.8***	 	
Obs	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	
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Table	A3	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	and	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	index	jointly	with	fixed	instruments	
This	 table	 presents	 average,	marginal	 effects	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
management	resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	the	end	of	the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	is	described	in	Table	1.	The	Gompers,	
Ishii,	and	Metrick	(2003)	(GIM)	index	for	the	extent	of	a	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	is	jointly	replaced	with	a	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	(BCF)	index,	
which	adds	one	for	each	antitakeover	provision	that	a	firm	has	out	of	a	subset	of	six	–	including	staggered/classified	board,	supermajority	amendment,	and	poison	
pill,	but	excluding	fair	price	amendment	–	from	the	GIM	index,	and	a	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	(KSW)	index,	which	is	the	GIM	index	minus	the	BCF	index.	
Columns	(1)	and	(2)	are	the	joint,	first	stages,	and	Column	(3)	is	the	second	stage,	of	an	instrumental‐variables	(IV),	probit	regression	(using	maximum‐likelihood	
estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	BCF	index,	the	KSW	index,	and	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	
on	a	bid.	The	instruments	for	the	BCF	index	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	are	pseudo,	BCF	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	
which	are	constructed	for	the	subset	of	six,	antitakeover	provisions	of	the	BCF	index	in	otherwise	the	same	way	as	those	for	the	GIM	index,	and	which	are	fixed	each	
year	from	an	original	lag	of	three	years,	instead	of	rolling	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	The	instruments	for	the	KSW	index	in	the	joint,	first	
stages,	only,	are	pseudo,	KSW	indices	for	peer	firms	and	HQ	firms,	which	are	those	for	the	GIM	index	minus	those	for	the	BCF	index,	and	which	are	also	fixed	each	
year	from	an	original	lag	of	three	years,	instead	of	rolling	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	three	years.	Column	(4)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(1),	(2),	and	(3),	
but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	fixed	instruments,	only,	for	the	BCF	index	and	KSW	index,	and	the	other	variables	that	are	not	
conditional	 on	 a	bid,	 but	with	 the	addition	of	 an	 exclusion	 restriction,	 California	 incorporation,	which,	with	 a	 lag	of	one	year,	 is	 equal	 to	one	 for	a	 firm	 that	 is	
incorporated	in	California	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(5)	and	(6)	are	the	joint,	first	
stages,	 and	Column	 (7)	 is	 the	 second	stage,	of	an	 IV,	 linear	probability	 regression	 (using	 two‐stage	 least‐squares	estimation)	 for	 the	 likelihood	of	management	
resistance	on	the	BCF	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	KSW	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	the	indicator	
for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	
(4).	The	instruments	for	the	BCF	index	and	KSW	index	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	fixed	ones	in	Column	(4).	The	other	variables	that	are	not	
conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(4).	Column	(8)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(5),	(6),	and	(7),	
but	 in	reduced	 form,	by	 linear	probability	regressing	the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	 fixed	 instruments,	only,	 for	 the	BCF	 index	and	KSW	index	
(indirect,	 causal	 relationships),	 the	other	variables,	 and	 the	 lambda	 for	 the	effects	of	 censoring	 firm	years	absent	a	bid.	 Standard	errors	are	 shown	 in	brackets	
underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(1),	(2),	(3),	and	(4),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(5),	(6),	(7),	and	(8).	***,	**,	*	denote	
statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 	 	 ‐0.0214	 	 	 	 ‐0.0769	 	
	 	 	 (0.0161)	 	 	 	 (0.0645)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.1025	 0.1514	 	 ‐0.0104	 0.3776**	 0.0456	 	 ‐0.0672	
	 (0.1157)	 (0.1792)	 	 (0.0067)	 (0.1546)	 (0.2305)	 	 (0.0511)	
HQ,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.3398***	 ‐0.0579	 	 ‐0.0057	 0.4968***	 ‐0.1317	 	 ‐0.0330	
	 (0.0821)	 (0.1161)	 	 (0.0046)	 (0.1201)	 (0.1767)	 	 (0.0375)	
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Table	A3	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	and	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	index	jointly	with	fixed	instruments	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
KSW	index	 	 	 ‐0.0028	 	 	 	 0.0841***	 	
	 	 	 (0.0044)	 	 	 	 (0.0286)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 0.1624***	 0.6532***	 	 ‐0.0018	 0.0542	 0.6615***	 	 0.0573***	
	 (0.0463)	 (0.0668)	 	 (0.0026)	 (0.0650)	 (0.0970)	 	 (0.0216)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 ‐0.0006	 0.4362***	 	 ‐0.0029	 ‐0.0041	 0.2883***	 	 0.0387*	
	 (0.0501)	 (0.0704)	 	 (0.0027)	 (0.0702)	 (0.1042)	 	 (0.0214)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 	 0.2010*	 ‐0.1183	 ‐0.0725**	 ‐0.0970***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.1070)	 (0.1504)	 (0.0348)	 (0.0303)	
All	cash	 	 	 	 	 ‐0.0163	 ‐0.0530	 0.0962***	 0.0972***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.0843)	 (0.1181)	 (0.0276)	 (0.0261)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0561**	 0.1462***	 ‐0.0101***	 ‐0.0104***	 0.0466	 0.1762***	 ‐0.0175	 ‐0.0056	
	 (0.0245)	 (0.0337)	 (0.0024)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0394)	 (0.0549)	 (0.0138)	 (0.0121)	
Leverage	 0.4353***	 0.1162	 0.0185	 0.0218**	 0.5363**	 0.3931	 0.0747	 0.0635	
	 (0.1636)	 (0.2227)	 (0.0122)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2601)	 (0.3715)	 (0.0908)	 (0.0752)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0699***	 ‐0.0043	 ‐0.0077***	 ‐0.0081***	 ‐0.1068**	 ‐0.0086	 ‐0.0395**	 ‐0.0319**	
	 (0.0177)	 (0.0237)	 (0.0024)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0425)	 (0.0649)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0143)	
Tangibility	 0.0859	 0.0484	 ‐0.0051	 ‐0.0050	 ‐0.0633	 ‐0.1584	 0.0365	 0.0259	
	 (0.0838)	 (0.1110)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1215)	 (0.1585)	 (0.0374)	 (0.0343)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.5579***	 ‐0.3105	 ‐0.0291**	 ‐0.0327***	 ‐0.2971	 ‐0.5396	 ‐0.0930	 ‐0.1118	
	 (0.1541)	 (0.2093)	 (0.0125)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2337)	 (0.3381)	 (0.0794)	 (0.0701)	
Sales	growth	 0.0059	 ‐0.0269**	 0.0016	 0.0016	 ‐0.0029	 0.0089	 ‐0.0013	 0.0000	
	 (0.0068)	 (0.0122)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0056)	 (0.0076)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 0.0963	 ‐0.0099	 ‐0.0178	 ‐0.0156	 ‐0.0809	 ‐1.4498***	 ‐0.0615	 ‐0.1920*	
	 (0.2039)	 (0.2619)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0153)	 (0.3096)	 (0.4862)	 (0.1248)	 (0.1115)	
Stock	return	 0.0995***	 0.0703**	 ‐0.0035	 ‐0.0031	 0.0359	 0.1308	 ‐0.0211	 ‐0.0115	
	 (0.0228)	 (0.0313)	 (0.0036)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0992)	 (0.1444)	 (0.0339)	 (0.0317)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.7140**	 ‐0.4088	 ‐0.0555**	 ‐0.0589***	 ‐0.2359	 ‐1.6390**	 ‐0.1446	 ‐0.2651	
	 (0.2955)	 (0.4146)	 (0.0232)	 (0.0192)	 (0.6472)	 (0.6899)	 (0.1709)	 (0.1621)	
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Table	A3	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	
Ferrell	(2009)	index	and	Karpoff,	Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017)	index	jointly	with	fixed	instruments 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 0.0396***	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 0.0655	 0.8686***	 0.1282	 0.1925***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.2385)	 (0.3342)	 (0.0782)	 (0.0716)	
Constant	 0.6692	 ‐1.7518***	 0.0460***	 0.0461***	 ‐0.2016	 ‐1.9105**	 ‐0.2738*	 ‐0.4917***	
	 (0.4177)	 (0.5773)	 (0.0071)	 (0.0014)	 (0.6017)	 (0.8542)	 (0.1595)	 (0.1840)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.6***	
Chi2	 375.8***	 367.0***	 59.2***	 	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6.2	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 8.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 3.4	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 23.5***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 9.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 1.6	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 13.8***	 	 10.0***	 	
Obs	 20,717	 20,717	 954	 954	
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Table	A4	
Causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	fixed	instruments	for	the	
extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions				
This	table	presents	average,	marginal	effects	for	the	causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	
resistance.	Main,	variable	definitions	are	provided	at	 the	end	of	 the	paper,	and	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	 is	described	 in	Table	1.	Column	(1)	 is	a	 linear	
regression	for	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	on	the	instruments,	only,	for	the	extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	(GIM	index),	the	
indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	
firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(3)	of	Table	7,	and	an	exclusion	restriction,	which	is	the	pseudo,	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	
pre‐bid	price	to	high	price.	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	are	the	pseudo,	GIM	indices	for	same‐age	(peer)	firms	and	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	and	are	
the	same	as	the	ones	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	7,	which	are	fixed	each	year	from	an	original	lag	of	three	years,	instead	of	rolling	forward	each	year	with	a	lag	of	at	least	
three	years.	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	
Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	 the	 first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	 instrumental‐variables	(IV),	 linear	probability	regression	(using	 two‐stage	 least‐squares	
estimation)	 for	the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	GIM	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	a	residual	(abnormal	part),	only,	 for	the	actual	premium	
offered	by	the	initial	bidder	(non‐causal	relationship)	that	is	generated	from	Column	(1),	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	
a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	first	
stage,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	fixed	ones	in	Column	(1),	and	the	fixed	ones	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	
same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(1),	and	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	
7.	Columns	(4)	and	(5)	do	the	same	as	Columns	(2)	and	(3),	respectively,	but	with	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	(non‐causal	relationship)	being	
jointly	included	with	the	residual.	Columns	(1)	and	(6)	are	the	joint,	first	stages,	and	Column	(7)	is	the	second	stage,	of	an	IV,	linear	probability	regression	(using	two‐
stage	least‐squares	estimation)	for	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	GIM	index	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	
bidder	(direct,	causal	relationship),	the	indicator	for	an	all,	cash	bid,	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid,	and	a	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	
years	absent	a	bid	that	is	generated	from	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	The	instruments	for	the	GIM	index	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	are	the	same	as	the	fixed	ones	in	
Column	(3)	of	Table	7,	and	the	instrument	for	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	in	the	joint,	first	stages,	only,	is	the	pseudo	one,	pre‐bid	price	to	high	
price.	The	other	variables	that	are	not	conditional	on	a	bid	are	the	same	as	those	(including	year	indicators	and	industry	indicators)	in	Column	(3)	of	Table	7.	Column	
(8)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(6)	and	(7),	but	in	reduced	form,	by	linear	probability	regressing	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	fixed	instruments,	
only,	for	the	GIM	index	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	instrument,	only,	for	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	(indirect,	causal	relationship),	the	
other	variables,	and	the	lambda	for	the	effects	of	censoring	firm	years	absent	a	bid.	Bootstrapped,	standard	errors	are	shown	in	brackets	underneath	the	marginal	
effects.	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 	 0.0447**	 	 0.0475**	 	 0.0475**	 	
	 	 	 (0.0191)	 	 (0.0197)	 	 (0.0202)	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 0.0042	 0.6369***	 	 0.6266***	 	 0.6234***	 	 0.0274**	
	 (0.0117)	 (0.0828)	 	 (0.0833)	 	 (0.0836)	 	 (0.0129)	
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Table	A4	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	fixed	instruments	for	the	
extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions 
	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
HQ,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 ‐0.0012	 0.3137***	 	 0.3003***	 	 0.3012***	 	 0.0219	
	 (0.0132)	 (0.1024)	 	 (0.1032)	 	 (0.1030)	 	 (0.0159)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 ‐0.7570	 0.1094	 	 0.1094	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.6386)	 (0.1106)	 	 (0.1135)	 	
Pre‐bid	price	to	high	price	 ‐0.6744***	 	 	 	 	 0.5105	 	 ‐0.0525	
	 (0.0840)	 	 	 	 	 (0.4305)	 	 (0.0711)	
Abnormal,	initial	premium	 	 0.1688	 ‐0.1181***	 0.9258	 ‐0.2280*	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.2192)	 (0.0341)	 (0.6752)	 (0.1199)	 	 	 	
All	cash	 ‐0.0180	 ‐0.0882	 0.0902***	 ‐0.1118	 0.0938***	 ‐0.0982	 0.0938***	 0.0876***	
	 (0.0242)	 (0.1600)	 (0.0264)	 (0.1617)	 (0.0271)	 (0.1603)	 (0.0277)	 (0.0260)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0117	 0.2223***	 ‐0.0121	 0.2006**	 ‐0.0097	 0.2094***	 ‐0.0097	 ‐0.0001	
	 (0.0125)	 (0.0765)	 (0.0129)	 (0.0800)	 (0.0130)	 (0.0778)	 (0.0134)	 (0.0122)	
Leverage	 0.1342*	 0.9320*	 ‐0.0028	 1.0509**	 ‐0.0221	 0.9493*	 ‐0.0221	 0.0338	
	 (0.0700)	 (0.5056)	 (0.0803)	 (0.5112)	 (0.0817)	 (0.5049)	 (0.0844)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0192	 ‐0.1152	 ‐0.0226	 ‐0.1290	 ‐0.0203	 ‐0.1144	 ‐0.0203	 ‐0.0274**	
	 (0.0143)	 (0.0917)	 (0.0150)	 (0.0920)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0906)	 (0.0148)	 (0.0138)	
Tangibility	 ‐0.0975***	 ‐0.2185	 0.0507	 ‐0.2909	 0.0618*	 ‐0.2171	 0.0618*	 0.0408	
	 (0.0344)	 (0.2278)	 (0.0346)	 (0.2364)	 (0.0367)	 (0.2287)	 (0.0369)	 (0.0333)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0825	 ‐0.8463*	 ‐0.0677	 ‐0.9146*	 ‐0.0558	 ‐0.8522*	 ‐0.0558	 ‐0.1028	
	 (0.0902)	 (0.4634)	 (0.0747)	 (0.4662)	 (0.0763)	 (0.4615)	 (0.0780)	 (0.0701)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0128***	 0.0048	 0.0003	 ‐0.0024	 0.0013	 0.0072	 0.0013	 0.0004	
	 (0.0018)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0115)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0105)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 0.2443	 ‐1.5272**	 ‐0.1215	 ‐1.4758**	 ‐0.1235	 ‐1.6607**	 ‐0.1235	 ‐0.1825*	
	 (0.1712)	 (0.6688)	 (0.1101)	 (0.6698)	 (0.1096)	 (0.6824)	 (0.1069)	 (0.1078)	
Stock	return	 0.0144	 0.1518	 ‐0.0099	 0.0547	 0.0036	 0.0438	 0.0036	 0.0085	
	 (0.0501)	 (0.2013)	 (0.0318)	 (0.2099)	 (0.0338)	 (0.2126)	 (0.0354)	 (0.0342)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.0054	 ‐1.8953*	 ‐0.1666	 ‐1.9708*	 ‐0.1505	 ‐1.9668*	 ‐0.1505	 ‐0.2433	
	 (0.1461)	 (1.1080)	 (0.1711)	 (1.1134)	 (0.1736)	 (1.1172)	 (0.1758)	 (0.1593)	
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Table	A4	(continued)	
Causal	relationship	between	the	actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance:	fixed	instruments	for	the	
extent	of	the	target	firm’s	antitakeover	provisions 
	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Bid	lambda	 ‐0.0346	 0.9593**	 0.1439*	 1.0228**	 0.1326*	 1.0490**	 0.1326*	 0.1740**	
	 (0.0824)	 (0.4711)	 (0.0794)	 (0.4758)	 (0.0805)	 (0.4790)	 (0.0803)	 (0.0710)	
Constant	 0.4422**	 ‐2.1607*	 ‐0.4226***	 ‐1.5523	 ‐0.4983***	 ‐1.8871	 ‐0.4983***	 ‐0.5826***	
	 (0.1859)	 (1.1524)	 (0.1477)	 (1.2798)	 (0.1747)	 (1.1820)	 (0.1791)	 (0.1852)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 8.7***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.4***	
Chi2	 	 65.8***	 65.6***	 53.1***	 	
R2	%	 14.0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.8	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 37.2***	 34.8***	 25.3***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 7.3	 6.9	 7.4	 	
F	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)	 	 	 	 	 	 21.5***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)		 	 	 	 	 	 10.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 0.2	 0.3	 0.3	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 4.8**	 5.2**	 7.0**	 	
Obs	 954	 954	 954	 954	 954	
	
